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CHAPTER VI

LEGAL PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE REASONABLE
USES OF OUTER SPACE
Even outer space is finite. Like the oceans it is subject, in varying
degrees, to sharable use. In the course of the use and exploration of
outer space and celestial bodies for peaceful purposes, a need has
arisen to establish the range of peaceful uses as well as a structured
legal regime capable of dealing with disputes that may grow out
of such uses. It is the purpose of this Chapter to investigate several
of the major legal issues which must be resolved if disputes over
ways of using outer space and celestial bodies for peaceful, i.e., nonaggressive and beneficial, purposes are to be kept to a minimum.
Several a;reas have been selected because of their importance to
the reasonable uses of outer space. They include the problem of international responsibility and liability for damages for harms resulting from the use of space vehicles and devices, possessory rights
over spacecraft, assistance to and return of space vehicles and personnel to the launching or operating authority, allocation of radio
facilities to space users, nationality of space vehicles, and jurisdiction
over space disputes.
The magnitude of these subjects may be affirmed through a recitation of some of the items which have been introduced into outer
space. These include, but are not limited to, rockets, missiles, satellites, space stations or platforms, orbital laboratories, nuclear substances by way of explosions or as power for generators, copper
needles, sodium vapor, water, such electrical impulses as radio, television and radar signals, and laser and maser beams. These instrumentalities and materials have had for their purposes the accumulation of scientific data regarding the nature of the universe, data
relating to the functioning of many kinds of spacecraft, and a great
variety of hybrid data. Acquisition of data will lead to improvement
in weather meteorology and forecasting, geodetic and navigational
facilities, scientific investigations, observational procedures, communications media, resource exploitation, transportation, and to a
more complete understanding of all of the less tangible scientific,
social, and political uses of outer space.
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Space problems will arise from the conduct of those entities engaged in launching, orbiting, and return procedures. The conduct
may be by a state, groups of states, international organizations, or
even private business entities.
Through the formulation of specific rules, it may be possible to
achieve a minimun1 interference with the reasonable uses of outer
space. Further, by obtaining tentative answers to these issues, there
will be greater insights into and a more substantial clarification of
the body of outer space law. In particular, it will be possible to add
meaning to the concept of the peaceful uses of outer space.

A. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY FOR
HARM AND DAI\IAGES
I. The Nature of the Problem

The relationship of individuals, governments, and international
organizations to harm resulting from the practices and procedures
of space vehicles has been analyzed by many commentators. They
have stressed the possibility of damage occurring on the surface of
the earth--either on land or at sea. Such damage may also occur in
the airspace and in outer space. It may result from accident, mistake,
or from intentional conduct. According to Haley:
Today, in spite of the extraordinary technological advances
which have been made, a launched rocket vehicle occasionally
descends to earth far from the spot chosen as its destination.
Inevitably, the ever-increasing range attainable by rocket vehicles will enhance the probability that such mishaps will not be
unco1nmon, since the greater distance ""ill magnify the result of
any error or defect in the vehicle's guidance system. If a vehicle
or parts of a vehicle should fall to earth causing property damage and personal injury, "Tho will be liable for such damage and
to what extent?
'Vhen a vehicle weighing thousands of pounds carrying great
quantities of the most volatile fuels kno,vn to man leaves the
earth it depends entirely for its guidance on an intricate system
of thousands of precisely designed and engineered parts, both in
the missile itself and on the ground. The slightest miscalculation
in the design, manufacture, or function of any single part could
result in disaster. Should disaster occur what would be the basis
of liability on which those injured could claim compensation?
Are there any analogies :from which we can dra 'v an answer? 1
1 Haley, "Space Vehicle Torts," 36 University of Detroit Law Journal 294
(1959). See also Haley, Space Law and Government 233-273 (1963). Compare,
McDougal, Lasswell and Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space 613-620 (1963).
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Major harm, bordering on limited disaster, son1e day may-and
probably will-result from the peaceful employment of satellites.
The nature of the harm may differ fron1 possible nuclear, bacteriological, or chemical accidents. Nonetheless, within an impact area
the dangers may be of significant magnitude. Nuclear energy has
been considered as the propulsion system for the Rover type satellite.
The Transit-4A satellite launched by the United States on June 29,
1961, was equipped with an experimental nuclear device (developed
by the Atomic Energy Commission) which continues to generate
electricity for navigational transmitters. The Transit-4B also used
nuclear powered generating equipment. Nuclear energy is considered
by many to be a natural tool for the exploration of outer space. 2
Disaster may also threaten from satellites and missile launches
because of the properties of nonnuclear propellants. It has been
stated that many such propellants possess extremely toxic qualities,
that there is little know ledge about antidotes, and that despite safety
measures, there remains the possibility that serious injury may result
by reason of an accident at time of launch. 3
Harm 1nay also result from the uncontrolled return to earth o£
space vehicles and devices, either in the form of the launched vehicle
or as frag1nents resulting from collision or in consequence of partial
combustion caused by transiting through heavy atlnosphere. 4 There
is a pressing need to provide for both safety of operation and to
create legal rights and remedies ready for use after harms have resulted. This responsibility confronts both national and international
policy makers.
2

Branch and Connor, "Nuclear Safety in Space," 19 Nucleonics 64-68 (April
1961). Connor, "Aerospace Nuclear Safety," 31 Aerospace Medic·ine 797-806
(October 1960). Compare, Libby, "Atomic Energy and Space," in Ramo, ed.,
Peacetime Uses of Outer Space 188, 190-191 (1961). The Snap-3 generator provides isotope power for satellites and has a life expectancy of about 40 years.
Hardy, "Nuclear Liability: The General Principles of Law and Further Proposals,'; 36 Brit. Yb. Int'l L. 223 (1960).
3 Reeves, New York Tirnes (vVestern ed.) February 5, 1963. Major Reeves
has served as Chief of Experimental Toxicology and Biokinetics of the United
States Air Force School of Aerospace l\Iedicine.
4 For an account of the suryeillance and recovery in :Manitowoc, Wisconsin,
on September 5, 1962, of a metal object weighing approximately t\Yenty pounds
constructed of alloy steel and which had been in outer space for a considerable
period of time, one may consult the statements of the United States represen·
tative to the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on September 14, 1962. The tender of this piece of Sputnik IV to the Soviet delegate was
rejected at that time. However, later at the request of the SoYiet government
it was turned over to their U.N. mission. The United States, prior to the return
of the material, had conducted scientific tests to determine its composition.
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.14, 56-60.
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It is true, as a careful report has indicated, that the role of law
may not serve to diminish the physical hazards of disastrous accidents. But it is "largely the law, supplemented by private arrangements such as insurance, that determines whether, 'vhen and to what
extent the victims will be compensated and how the burden of compensation 'vill be distributed among governments, industry and insurers. The problem of devising fair and practicable means of compensating the victims and distributing financial losses is in large
measure a legal one; if accidents occur in a foreign country, it becomes in part a political and diplomatic problem as well." 5
At the present there is a need for a threefold approach to the protection of persons and property (both real and personal) from space
related torts, 'vhether accidental or intentional. In the first place, the
resource states must enact suitable laws providing adequate protection to those who may suffer injury. Secondly, nations generally will
benefit from entering into express international agree1nents providing
for national responsibility for such harms. Such agreements would
of necessity have to make suitable provision for the torts of a state,
of groups of states, for those of private persons, and for international
organizations. 6 Thirdly, after international standards have been
s Financial Protection Against Risks of !Jfajor Harm in Government Programs 1 (March 1963). Compare, International Problems of Financial Protec·
tion Against Nttclear Risk 1 (1959). If recovery were sought in the national

courts of a country one legal problem might be the recognition of such a judg·
ment in the courts of another state. See Nadelman, "Ways to Unify Conflicts
Rules," in De Oonfiictu Legum, editors, Netherlands International Law Review
354-357 (1962).
6 On December 24, 1963, the General Assembly of the U.N. unanimously
adopted Resolution 1962 (XVIII), which contained, among others, the follow·
ing declarations:
5. States bear international responsibility for national activities in
outer space, whether carried on by governmental agencies or non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried on in
conformity with the principles set forth in the present Declaration. The
activities of non-governmental entities in outer space shall require authori·
zation and continuing supervision by the State concerned. When activities
are carried on in outer space by an international organization, responsibility for compliance with the principles set forth in this Declaration shall
be borne by the international organization and by the States participating
in it.
8. Each State which launches or procures the launching of an object
into outer space, and each State from whose territory or facility an object
is launched, is internationally liable for damage to a foreign State or to
its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on
the earth, in air space, or in outer space.
For the entire Resolution, see Annex 4, infra, p. 450-452.
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established by express international agreement, there will be a need
to conform national laws to these standards. 7
In the United States, existing legislative enactments have failed
to make provision for any more than nominal damages on the part
of the national government for extra-hazardous space activities,
which are carried on at the instance of the government, and which
may cause great harm to life and property. The 1963 study prepared
by the Legislative Drafting Fund of Columbia University for the
National Security Industrial Association has indicated that a member of the public in the United States would have to proceed for
redress of injuries by way of law suit sounding in tort. It added:
The outlook for injured members of the public in the wake of
a catastrophe is uncertain: apart from the problems of proof
faced by plaintiffs in any tort action, to victims of a catastrophe
special difficulties would be presented in identifying the actor
for the injury, proving his liability in a lawsuit, and then finding
sufficient assets from which a judgment could be satisfied.
The United States Government would, of course, possess
sufficient assets to satisfy judgments arising out of any but the
most cataclysmic of accidents. However, even though the programs under consideration [including most space activities] are
by definition governmental programs, there is considerable doubt
that an injured member of the public will be able to recover
damages from, or even to sue, the government. 8
Nations have a deep interest in the protection of their nationals
from harm arising from distant places. It has been urged that the
ultimate ascertainment of responsibility for compensation remains
a domestic matter. 9 However, as noted above, by international agreement states may arrive at standards "\vhich can be implemented and
enforced in municipal law. Such problems may also be referred to
international judicial bodies.
Factors to be considered at both the national and international
level endeavoring to protect those likely to suffer harm include: suits
against a government, sovereign immunity of government, suits
7

Quadri, "Droit International Cosmique," 98 Recueil des Oours 588, 589-592
(1959).
8 Financial Protection, supra note 5, at 7, 10. Compare, Haley, supra note
1, at 299-300, 303-314; Simeone, "Space-A Legal Vacuum," ]filitary La'lo Review, Pam. 27-100-16, 51 (April 1962) ; McCollum, "Tort Aspects of Space
Technology," 8 Cleveland-Marshall Law Review 292 (1959).
9
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.22, 14. The view was expressed by the representative of France.
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against contractors and suppliers, protection through insurance coverages, liability of a state, possible liability of a state for private
activity when authorized, liability of associations of states, liability
of international organizations, procedures for pursuing claims, and
legal bases for liability, including nuisance, 10 negligence,11 fault, 12
and strict or absolute liability. 13
2. Deliberations at the United Nations

Efforts at the United Nations to establish detailed rules of liability
for space vehicle accidents, including accidents in outer space, have
considerably clarified expectations as to acceptable space behavior.
As early as 1D59, the United Nations Ad H oo Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space suggested that the subject of liability for injury or damage caused by space vehicles \vas one susceptible of
priority treatment. It put forward the follo,ving subjects for legal
analysis and consideration:
First of all there is the question of the type of interest protected: that is, the kind of injury for which recovery may be
had. Second, there is the question of the type of conduct giving
rise to liability: should liability be without regard to fault for
some or all activities, or should it be based upon fault? Third,
should a different principle govern, depending on whether the
place of injury is on the surface of the earth, in the air space or
in outer space? Fourth, should liability of the launching State
be unlimited in a1nount? Finally, \vhere 1nore than one State
Haley, supra note 1, at 294.
n Ibid., 295.
12 This was mentioned by the British representative at the United Nations
as a possibility among others. U.N. Doc. A/AC..105/0.2/SR.17, 8-9. To the
same effect, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/0.2/SR.25, 5. See Verschoor, "The Responsibility of States for the Damage Caused by Launched Space-Bodies," First Colloquiurn 103 (1959).
13 Cooper, "l\Iemorandum of Suggestions for an International Convention on
Third Party Damage Causes by Space Vehicles," Third Colloquiunlt 141; Legal
Problems of Space Exploration, A Syn~posiu1n 680. Cooper distinguished between liability in space and on the ground. l\Iankiewicz, "The Regulation of
Activities in Extra-Aeronautical Space, and some Related Problems," 8 jfcGill
Law Journal 209 (19G2) ; Haley, supra note 1 at 294; :\lankiewicz, "De l'Ordre
Juridique dans l'Espace Extra-Aeronautique," 5 Annuaire Francaise de Droit
International 142 (1959) ; Beresford, "Liability for Ground Damage Caused
by Spacecraft," 19 Federal Bar Journal 254 (1959) ; Legal Problems of Outer
Space, A SyntposiuJn 552; Simeone, supra note 8, at 51; Verschoor, supra note
12 at 103; Hingorani, "Damage by Satellite," 30 University of Kansas City
Law Review 216-218 (1962).
10
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participates in a particular activity, is the liability joint or
several? 14
The discussions at the United Nations have proceeded on the assumption that international liability for mishaps involving space
vehicles is governed by international la'v and the Charter. In draft
proposals submitted by the United l{ingdoin,15 the United States,I6
and the Soviet Union, 17 this point has been accepted. The United
States and the United Kingdom have taken the view that space
activity may also be governed by other international agreements.
Proposals dealing with international liability have also been subrnitted by Belgium. 18 The many proposals culminated in the adoption
of Resolution 1962 (8) (XVIII) on December 24, 1963.
The importance of the various proposals, the unanimous Resolution
of the General Assembly, and national vie,vs as to acceptability of
stated principles require a detailed analysis. In the first place, it
should be noted that an effort was made by the representative of the
United States to summarize before the legal subcommittee of the
U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the conclusions
arriYed at in that body. In April 1963, he stated that in connection
\vith the question of ';liability for space vehicle accidents, there was
general agreement that launching authorities should be held internationally liable for injuries or damage on land, on sea, and in the air
caused by space vehicles for which they were responsible." 19 This
is a carefully qualified statement, but it does suggest the existence
of a legal duty on the part of a state, international organizations,
and associations of states. It also suggests the responsibility of such
entities for activities carried on with their permission by private
persons. It was pointed out that "There was also a consensus of
opinion that such liability should be incurred without proof of
fault." 20 It will be noted that no reference 'vas made to liability
14

U.N. Doc. A/4141, 23-24, Annex 20, infra, p. 472.
D .N. Doc. A/0.1/87!}, Annex 18, i-nfra, p. 469.
1 6 D .N. Doc. A/0.1/881, Annex 10, infra, p. 459.
1 7 D.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.6, Annex 16, infra, p. 466.
18 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.7, Annex 17, infra, p. 468.
19 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.16, 3-4.
The United States recognized this
principle again in September 1963. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.20, 18.
20 Ibid., 4. The Australian delegate subsequently stated that there was "com15

plete agreement in broad principle that a State launching a space vehicle should
be internationally liable, without fault, for injury, loss or damage caused by
the vehicle on the earth or in the air space." U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.23, 3.
Compare, ~feyer, "Legal Problems of Outer Space," 28 The Journal of Air
Law and Commerce, 344-346 (1962) ; Lyon, "Space Vehicles, Satellites, and the
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for accidents occurring in outer space. The United States, by accepting General Assembly Resolution 1962 (8) (XVIII), has thereby
agreed to a space law principle for outer space as well as for land,
sea, and air accidents and events.
The United States, at the close of 1962, had put forward two proposals on the subject of liability. The first, dated September 11,
1962, contained specific rules, which if adopted-with modifications'vould provide an adequate legal regulation of the problem of liability. 21 The second, dated December 8, 1962, was broadly stated and
somewhat limited in scope. The latter in Article 6 provided: "A
State or international organization from whose territory or with
whose assistance or permission a space vehicle is launched bears international responsibility for the launching, and is internationally
liable for personal injury, loss of life, or property damage caused
by such vehicle on the earth or in air space." 22
The United States representative, Mr. Meeker, examined the import of Article 6 before the legal subcommittee on April24, 1963. He
stated that the provision for international responsibility "covered
the possibility of a Government enlisting the help of a private corporation or firm, which it might authorize to carry out activities in
space, subject to continuing Government supervision." 23 He noted
that pursuant to specific United States legislation, namely, the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, there had been acceptance of the
principle of national responsibility for national space activities.
Since some space activities have been carried out under private
auspices, this reference was intended to reassure a few states which
have been of the opinion that international space activities should be
conducted only by states. This restrictive position is no longer advanced by any state, as illustrated by the unanimous vote given to
General Assembly Resolution 1962 (5) (XVIII). 24
Mr. Meeker stated that "The first part of the principle in the
United States draft was designed to sho'v the international responsibility of any Government from whose territory or with whose
assistance or permission space projects were undertaken. The second
Law." 7 McGill Law Journal 283-284 (1961) ; Financial Protection, supra note
5, at 70-86; Cooper, Verplaetse, Beresford, von Rauchhaupt, Third Colloquium
133-136; Beresford and Yeager, "Survey of Space Law," Committee on A.stro·
nautics and Space Exploration, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 22-26 (1959).
21 U.N. Doc. A/ AC.l05/L.5; U.N. Doc. A/5181, Annex 9, infra, p. 458.
22 U.N. Doc. A/C.l/881, Annex 10, infra, p. 459.
23 U.N. Doc. A/AC..105/C.2/SR.20, 12.
24 Annex 4, infra, p. 450.
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part of the principle stated the idea of financial liability, which was
also included in paragraph 11 of the Soviet draft. The United States
draft, however, was more precise since it specified what types of injury and damage were envisaged and said that responsibility existed
for such damage or injuries on the earth or in air space." 25 He noted
that it would be necessary to establish a different rule for outer space
because of the difficulties involved in applying the doctrine of absolute liability in that dimension. 26
The United States has maintained that intricate legal problems are
involved in the launch, use, operation, and return of space vehicles,
and that an express international agreement is the preferred process
for coping with international rights and duties. The scope of legal
liability may depend on many variables. These include, for example,
the launch by one country of a space vehicle owned by another
country, the launch by one country of a space vehicle in the territory
of another country, and the cooperative launch by two or more
countries in a third country of a vehicle owned by a fourth country.
The variables are indeed wide. 27
The United States has also sought specific agreement as to the
procedures to be employed in the presentation of claims and as to
the forum where a state might obtain an interpretation or application of such a convention. With this in mind, the United States submitted a draft proposal on liability for space vehicle accidents on
September 11, 1962. The scope of this draft was limited to personal
injury and loss of life or property damage occurring on land, sea,
or in the air. It recognized that states and international organizations responsible for the launching of space vehicles should be liable
internationally for resulting injury, loss, or dan1age. It accepted
the rule of absolute liability for this kind of harm on the part of the
launching entity, but noted that "the degree of care which ought
reasonably to have been exercised by the person or entity on whose
behalf claim is made might properly be taken into account." 28
The Soviet draft appears infra, p. 466, Annex 16.
Acceptance by the United States of Resolution 1962 (8) (XVIII) has
signified acceptance of a single rule for earth, airspace, and space situated and
damages.
27 The representative of the United Kingdom has called attention to the need
for a careful analysis of these issues, and has said: "Various combinations of
interests might therefore be involved in an outer space project and one should
not think only in terms of a State which owned both the launching apparatus
and tho space vehicle." U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.25, 3.
2 3 U.N. Doc . ...\./AC.105/L.5; U.N. Doc. A/5181, Annex 9, infra, p. 458.
20

26

Ibid.
Ibid.

791--405--66----24
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The United States draft further suggested that there was no need
for a claimant to exhaust local remedies prior to filing a claim, noted
the applicability of the concept of laches, and referred disputes "relating to the interpretation or application of the international agreement on liability in the absence of agreement between the States concerned upon another means of settlement" to the International Court
of Justice. Finally, presentation of claims was to be accomplished
internationally by dealing with the state or states or international
organization responsible for the launching of the vehicle which
caused the injury. 29
The representative of the United I\::ingdom also held the view in
:\,l ay 1963, that there was general agreement among the n1embers of
the legal subcommittee that "liability should be absolute." 30 It was
pointed out that it would be possible for several states and international organizations, as well as private persons, to engage in cooperative space efforts, and that this presented problems affecting the
·assignment of liability. Several possible criteria were mentioned for
the determination of liability, such as responsibility for launch, effectiYe control oYer subsequent operation, and o''nership. HoweYer, it
was suggested that the need to arrive at a rule for the apportionment
of liability would not modify the need to establish a rule of absolute
liability. 31
The British representative, after noting that the United States
favored imposing liability on the launching entity, observed that it
was "doubtful whether that formula 'vould work satisfactorily in
the case where an international organization launched a space vehicle
for a State which was not a member of the organization, but the organization itself had no control over the subsequent operation of the
vehicle." 32 The United I\::ingdom also pointed out that the United
States view (that liability was to be assigned against the state of
launch), might not be appropriate 'vhere the state whose "territory
was used for the launching was merely providing a convenient
launching site and was not in any way concerned with the vehicle's
subsequent operation." 33 These comments emphasized the possibility
Ibid. If such matters were to come before the World Court for adjudication, the claim would be presented by a nation-state or perhaps by an international organization.
3o U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.25, 5.
29

Ibid.
Ibid., 4.
33 Ibid.
31

32
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that operation as well as launch ought to be weighed in determining
liability. 34
The British representative also called to the attention of the legal
subcommittee the language of paragraph 11 of the Soviet statement
of general principles, which made provision that a state undertaking
activities in outer space bore international responsibility for such
conduct. 35 It was thought by the British representative that such a
formula could be construed to mean that a launching state was responsible even when it had no control over the vehicle's subsequent
operations or where its participation was limited to making its territory available for a launch. It was also pointed out by the British
delegate that the Soviet formulation might exclude an international
organization from responsibility for space vehicle accidents, but that
the draft could be interpreted to mean that "the States composing
the organization should always be held to be directly liable for any
injury or damage caused by a space vehicle." 36 It was noted that
prirna facie it appeared that the international organization might be
liable in the first instance, but that under the constitution of any international body it might be possible to provide that the members
would be obliged to discharge the liability of the organization.
The inadequacy of the Soviet draft principle, despite its recognition of the need for a structured legal regime in outer space, may be
observed by comparing it with the United States and Belgian proposals.
34 The French representative also noted that space activities might include
launch, operation, and use by states or associations of states. In his view it
was essential that such entities "should accept liability for the injuries which
might arise from those activities." U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.22, 14.
35 The Soviet draft, like the British draft, has dealt only with broad principles. The Soviets have advanced the view that "A State undertaking activities in outer space bears international responsibility for damage done to a
foreign State or to its physical or juridical persons as a result of such activities." U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.6. The British draft has suggested that space
activity should be conducted "with due regard to the interests of other States."
U.N. Doc. A/0.1/879, Annex 18, infra, p. 469.
36
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.25, 4. The Soviet representative in September
1963, retreated from earlier Soviet proposals which would have sought to restrict space activities to states. In commenting on the conduct of activities in
space by private companies, under the supervision or control of a government,
it was stated: "The Soviet delegation considers it essential to point out that
in this field it would be possible to consider the question of not excluding from
the declaration possibility of activity in outer space by private companies,
on the condition that such activity would be subject to the control of the appropriate State, and the State would bear international responsibility for it."
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.22, 37. Compare Resolution 1962 (XVIII).
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The Belgian delegation to the United Nations submitted a detailed
analysis dealing with the Unification of Certain Rules Governing
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Vehicles. 37 This draft dealt
systematically with five phases of the problem: definitions, designation of states subject to liability, nature of the liability, extent of
liability, and procedures for bringing action for liability.
The Belgian proposal made provision for extending co1npensation
for damage to movable and immovable property and to natural and
legal persons. Damage 'vas understood to mean any loss for which
compensation may be claimed under the national law of the injured
person, "including judicial and legal costs and interest." 38 The proposal made no provision for damage "caused on the territory of the
State where the launching of the device or devices takes place, the
State whose flag the device or devices fly or the State or States claiming o'vnership or co-ownership of the device or devices." 39 Territory
of a state was defined to include only land areas, territorial and adjacent waters, and ships flying its flag and aircraft registered to it ..
Presumably the proposal would cover events taking place on the
high seas, in non-national airspace, and in outer space.
Pursuant to Article 2 o£ this proposal, liability would be litnited
to a state or groups of states, and only a state might be a claimant
although the latter would be permitted to act on behalf of injured
nationals or residents. The claimant state would be authorized t()
proceed against the state on whose territory the launch took placet
or the state whose flag was flo,vn, or the state or states claiming
ownership or co-ownership of the space device. In this connection it
'vas provided that there could not be "joint liability or solidarity." 4 o.
The following provision was made as to liability:
The occurrence of the event causing the damage shall entail
an obligation to give compensation once proof has been given
that there is a relationship of cause and effect between the damage, on the one hand, and the launching, motion or descent of all
or part of the space device on the other hand.
The presence or absence of a relationship of cause and effect
shall be determined in accordance with the national law of the
person injured. 41
37

U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.7; U.N. Doc. A/AC/105/12; Annex 17, infra"
p. 468.
ss Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
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With regard to the extent of liability the proposal called for the
application of the "ordinary law of the country of the person injured." 42
Claims for liability 'vere to be brought initially through diplomatic
channels, subject to a statute of limitations of one year. If the state
against which the claim had been presented failed to arrive at a
"decision considered satisfactory by the plaintiff State within six
months, the latter shall be entitled to take the claims for compensation before the International Court of Justice." 43 The proposal
established a six months statute of limitations applicable to these
actions before the World Court.
The Belgian delegate to the legal subcommittee explained the proposals in May 1963. He asserted that damage occurring on the territory of the launching state or on the territory of the flag state or
on that of the state or states claiming ownership of the device was
not of an international character. In this connection he noted that
"the States concerned would have to settle any problems that arose
through bilateral and not multilateral channels." 44
It was explained that the Belgian proposal related to collisions
between space devices, and apparently also between such devices and
aircraft, for it was stated that "his delegation did not accept the
idea of a space boundary and thought that space law should apply
to space devices whether moving in controlled air space, in uncontrolled air space or in outer space; otherwise a space device could be
subject to either air law or space law, depending on the altitude at
which it was moving." 45 Damages were to be measured by the national law of the injured person so that compensation would reflect
only particular national economic and social factors.
It was his view that Article 2 of this proposal, dealing with the
liability of states, would not preclude private persons from launching
and orbiting space devices. However, it was expected that such
activity would be subject to prior authorization by the state from
'vhich the launch might take place. On this basis the launching
state would be expected to be liable for both private and public harms
42

43

Ibid.
Ibid. Pursuant to the proposal each state would be obliged to conform to

the decision of the Court within three months after it bad given its judgment.
Further, there could be no tolling of the statute of limitations. There could
be a joinder of actions under certain circumstances. Presumably the claimant
state would be able to make claims on behalf of its residents as well as for
itself.
44
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.25, 6.
4 5 Ibi-d., 7.
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to others. There could be one exception to the right on the part of
the injured person (represented by a state) to bring a claim against
only one state and this would be where "several devices for which
different States were responsible simultaneously caused damage to
third persons." 46
In com1nenting on the nature and extent of national liability, the
Belgian representative noted that harm might result not only from
the descent of a space device but also that it might be the product of
the launching or motion of the device. The following example was
given: "An aircraft might be damaged because its crew had tried to
avoid a collision with a space device or because it had been struck
by a space device or part of a device, even though the latter itself
disintegrated and caused no direct damage." 41 It was also his view
that the nature and extent of liability ought to be based on the national law of the person injured rather than on an internationally
accepted definition "which could only be an arbitrary and unsatisfactory common denominator." 48
During the April-~fay 1963 meeting of the legal subcomn1ittee of
the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, many delegations compared or commented on the matter of liability as contained
in the United States and the Soviet statements of principles and on
the United States and Belgian proposals relating to detailed rules.
The Indian representative noted the existence of "a parallel" between Article 6 of the United States principles and Article 11 of the
Soviet principles. 49 He held the view that Article 7 of the Soviet
statement of principles, which urged that launching of space vehicles
be limited to states only, was met by the terms of Article 6 of the
United States statement of principles, since the latter sought to
avoid the possibility of irresponsibility on the part of private launchers. In order to further clarify the issue, however, it was his view
that provision might be made that space vehicles should not be "operated by individuals or corporations except with a license granted
by the State of which they were nationals and that the State should
give full clearance before each launching." 50
Ibid.
Ibid., 7.
48 Ibid.
The British representative had previously called attention to the
need to arrive at a decision how "liability should be assigned in cases where
more than one State or organization was involved and whether liability should
be limited in amount." U.N. Doc. A/AC.103/C.2/SR.17, 9.
4 9 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.28, 5.
50 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.22, 9. The Soviet view that only states might
engage in space launches had been subjected to much criticism on the ground
that it sought to impose a single and preferred social and economic system for
space exploration.
46

41
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General agreement was expressed that privately launched space
vehicles should be required to obtain national licenses prior to launch.
The Canadian representative observed that in order to "guard against
irresponsible activities, the operation of space craft by private in~ividuals, corporations or organizations should be explicitly forbidden save under license from the State of nationality. That would
satisfy the Soviet Union's rightful concern that States should bear
final responsibility for the space activity of national and international organizations, and a valuable principle, applicable to both
structures of society, could be drafted." 51
A comparison was made by the Czechoslovakian delegate between
the United States and Belgian proposals. In noting that the Unitecl
States proposal did not cover events taking place in outer space, he
failed to acknowledge the view of the United States that this subject
should be dealt with separately. 52 Regarding the Belgian proposal,.
he seemingly failed to realize that it did make provision for collisions
in outer space when he told the subcommitte that this proposal did
not cover damage caused iJy one space vehicle to another in outer
space. 53
On the subject of liability he complained that neither draft considered "damage cause by explosions or other experiments conducted
at very high altitudes." 54 These problems, of course, had been made·
the subject of numerous discussions at the United Nations wherein
the United States had made known its policy to consult with
COSPAR prior to injecting possibly dangerous or experimental
materials into outer space. 55 While acknowledging that both drafts
took into account the principle of absolute liability, he stated that
this was not in accordance with the "current practice of States as:
51

U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.21, 6. This vie'v was supported by Japan,
which also held that licenses should be issued only to nationals. U.N. Doo.
A/AC.105/C.2/SR.22, 11. The United Kingdom suggested that licensing might
be accompanied by state supervision of private launches, since, "the underlying·
principle was that the nature of space operations required a continuing state
of responsibility for them, whatever arrangements might be made between a
State and private operators. The United States Communications Satellite Act
(1962), expressed in very concrete form the concepts of governmental permission·
and governmental supervision." U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.24, 12.
52 Supra, p. 359.
53 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.25, 9.
Compare Resolution 1962 (XVIII).
54 Ibid.
For the 1963 Moscow Treaty, Annex 19, infra, p. 470.
55 Supra, pp. 219-245, 303-318.
Compare Article 6 of the Soviet draft declara-tion, Annex 16, infra, p. 466.
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illustrated by ~t\.rticles 20 and 21 of the 1~Varsa'v Convention 56 [for
the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, 1929, governing liability of air carriers to passengers
and to cargo consignees], nor with the provisions of the Brussels
Convention on liability of nuclear ships [European Convention on
Nuclear Damage]" 57 . It should be noted, however, that the Rome.
Conventions for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Damage
Caused by Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface, of 1933 and
1952, have adopted the rule of liability ·without fault. In commenting
<>n this aspect of liability, Beresford has written that since "contributary negligence is a defense under article 6, it is more accurate
to say that the causing of ground damage creates a conclusive presumption of negligence." 58 Hingorani, on the other hand, considers
the European Convention on Nuclear Damage to be inadequate as an
.analogy for liability for space activity. He has said that one may
not receive "any guidance from the European Convention on Nuclear
Damage, 'vhere liability is limited, because it is not a universal con-vention and is fixed arbitrarily." 59
56

The Warsaw Convention, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. 876. The United States ratified

ihe Convention on July 31, 1934, with one reservation. Articles 20 and 21
·excuse the carrier from liability if it can prove that all necessary measures
were taken to a void damage or in the alternative that it was impossible for
it to take such measures. Liability on the part of the carrier was excused re·
·specting the transportation of goods and baggage if there were a showing that
there was a pilot, handling, or navigational error and in all other respects
-the carrier had taken all necessary measures to avoid damage. Contributory
negligence could also be a complete or partial defense. Under the Hague Pro·
tocol of 1955, the carrier's immunity from liability was restricted by eliminat·
ing the defenses of error in piloting, handling of the aircraft, or navigating.
In the Protocol the following language no longer appeared: "in all other re·
spects he and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the
·damage." An analysis of the Warsaw Convention, The Hague Protocol, and
international limitation of liability relating to aircraft is contained in the
addresses of Lissitzyn, Calkins, and l\Ietzger at the 1962 annual meeting of
the American Society of International Law. Proceedings of the American
Society of International Law 115-132 (1962).
57 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.25, 9.
58 Beresford, "Principles of Spacecraft Liability," Third Oolloquiutn 156,
·footnote 5. This amounts to "absolute liability on the proof of damage * * *"
Simeone, supra note 8, at 53. Compare, l\Ieyer, supra note 20, at 344.
59 Hingorani, Sit pra n0te 13. at 217. He has added that limitation of liability
requires tltat there be an adequate means of assessing it, and that perhaps
"future events may evolve a method of fixing liability based on weight or manu·
facturing cost of the satellite or eY"en some arbitrary figure as fixed among
nations." Ibid., 217.

367
The Czech representative, without noting the differences between
the Warsaw Convention of 1929, as n1odified at The Hague in 1955,
and the Rome Conventions of 1933 and 1952, did recognize that liability provisions relating to air transport (as well as maritime transport) were not necessarily applicable to damages resulting from
spacecraft accidents. In his view, states might be relieved of liability
either partially or fully if damage resulted from the collision of a
space vehicle with a meteorite, but suggested that responsibility and
liability would apply to a state for causing harm by means of an
explosion in space or by means of launching an uncontrollable object.
Such conduct involved "harmful acts" 60 and liability should be that
of states and not other launching entities. In this way, claims for
harms should be accomplished by means of direct negotiations between the state within which the damage was caused and "the State
causing the damage." 61 He was critical of the terms contained in
the United States and Belgian drafts making provision for ultimate
recourse to the World Court in view of the fact that the "Court's
jurisdiction would not necessarily be recognized by all States." 62
The delegates from a number of states expressed views on the proposals contained in the several drafts. At the beginning of the discussions, the Austrian representative stated that the United States
had put forward "a useful proposal." 63 In summarizing the work
of the legal subcommittee, he stated that there had been unanimity
that the draft declaration of basic principles should make provision
that "States 'vere liable for damage caused by space vehicles." 64
The Italian representative noted that states with limited space resources should be induced to participate in the space programs of
international organizations and these organizations would be responsible for harms caused. The liability of each participant state would
then be apportioned on the basis of the "actual participation of a
given country in a project." 65 The Canadian representative expressed
the view that a state, states acting cooperatively, and international
organizations engaging in space activities must assume responsibility
for their conduct, and that "explicit reference might be made to the
principle of the liability of States for internationally injurious acts
U.N. Doc.
Ibid.
62 Ibid., 10.
63 U.N. Doc.
64 U.N. Doc.
65 U.N. Doc.
6o

A/ AC.105/C.2/SR.25, 9.

61

A/AC.105/C.2/SR.16, 6.
A/AC.105/C.2/SR.28, 3.
A/AC.105/C.2/SR.20, 6.
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of their nations or national organizations." 66 .A.lbania subscribed to
the view that a state should be considered liable for damage caused
by it. 61 Argentina supported the view that states or international
<>rganizations "authorizing or carrying out the launching [of space
~raft] was internationally liable." 68
After taking note of the differing views as to liability to be found
in divergent national legal systems, the Hungarian representative
stressed the view that basic space principles should be accepted internationally prior to the elaboration of rules on liability. He limited
his observations to a single cause of liability, namely, a collision
affecting a space vehicle or its crew. He urged that in principle,
liability should be imposed on the launching party, and that each
-of the "parties concerned should assume liability for the damage it
had sustained, with the following exceptions: ( 1) if one of the
parties had undertaken the launching 'vith a view to pursuing an
unlawful ~tivity, or if the space vehicle or object in question had
-exercised an unlawful effect, that party should assume full liability;
(2) if one of the parties produced evidence that damage had been
{!a used through the wilful act or gross negligence of the other party,
the latter should also assume liability for the damage caused to the
iormer." 69 Following the views expressed by other members of the
Communist bloc, it was suggested that disputes be resolved by pacific
means pursuant to Article 33 of the U.N. Charter, with a preference
for arbitration by mutual consent. Reference to the International
Court of Justice was not regarded as a satisfactory procedure. 70 The
Czech representative charged that some states sought to engage in
"''espionage" and unpermitted experiments in outer space and that
it was their intent to refuse to accept liability for damages caused
by such activities. 11 He also stated that existing legal norms probably
-covered damages caused by spacecraft on land, in the air, and on the
sa U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.21, 6. The Soviet delegate in urging initially
that space activities be conducted by states, noted that the states which held
that private bodies be permitted to use outer space had taken the view that
"the State concerned should have ultimate responsibility." U.N. Doc•
..A/AC.105/C.2/SR.22, 5.
61 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.24, 3.
68 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.24, 10.
Argentina also expressed the view that
"the answers to such questions as the class of interests protected, the type
of activity giving rise to liability and other connected problems would vary
-with the particular legal system applied in analysing thein." Ibid.
6 9 U.N. Doc. A/ AC.105/C.2/SR.26, 5.
70 Ibid., 6.
n U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.28, 7.
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sea but that the "question of liability for damage caused in outer
space had not been regulated * * *" 72
During the April-May 1963 discussions in the legal subcommittee,
progress was made in complying with the mandate o£ the General
Assembly contained in Resolution 1802 (XVII). Part A o£ the
Resolution requested that urgent attention be given to the further
"elaboration of basic legal principles governing * * * liability £or
space vehicle accidents * * *." 73 It was not, however, possible to arrive at a consensus on all points raised.
Progress was made in establishing a consensus that harms caused
by space vehicles should be compensated, particularly if the effects
were experienced on the surface of the earth, including the oceans,
and in the airspace. There was not the same consensus respecting
harms taking place in outer space.
Liability was held to pertain principally to states, although when
space activities were conducted by groups o£ states or by international organizations the liability became that of the responsible body.
A state was thought to be responsible £or damages caused by private
entities having been authorized or permitted to launch a space vehicle from its territory. It was generally agreed that private space
activities should be conducted only after having been licensed or
registered by a state, and that the licensing state should Undertake
inspection and identification procedures prior to launch to insure
the maintenance of adequate safety standards.
It was suggested that the state o£ launch need not be the only responsible party, in that liability might also result £rom operation
and use o£ a space vehicle, and that many combinations as to launch,
operation, and use might be expected. "\Vhere groups of states and
international organizations engaged in launch, operation, or use, it
was suggested that liability might be apportioned pursuant to express
agreement and that international organizations might provide, in
their own constitutional structure, £or a formula £or sharing payments of damages, but that states either as principals or as underwriters might ultimately be held accountable £or the payment of
damages.
There was general agreement that liability for harms resulting on
the ground, on the sea, and in airspace should be strict or absolute,
assuming the nonexistence of any intent to cause harm. However,
in the event o£ collision between spacecraft-and probably between
spacecraft and aircraft-some doubt was expressed as to the appli72
73

Ibid.
Resolution 1802 (XVII).

Annex 3, inj1·a, p. 446.
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cability of the rule of absolute liability. While there was apparent
agreement that an international standard ought to be established, the
vie'' "Was also expressed that states under their own domestic law
should establish the monetary limitations on such liability. The need
for an express international agreement establishing both the principle of absolute liability and the monetary limits of national liability
was generally conceded. 74 No figure as to the limits of such liability
was mentioned.
There "Was no agreement as to the legal or political procedures
whereby claims for damages might be litigated or negotiated. The
states of the Free \Vorld generally favored the use of existing legal
institutions such as the International Court of Justice or international commissions. The members of the Communist bloc expressed
their long standing opposition to regularized legal institutions, particularly the World Court, and suggested that settlements be negotiated. The members of the Communist bloc also asserted the need
to establish a broad statement of principles, whereas the Free World
states regarded the subject of liability for damages as being a very
practical one capable of supporting detailed rules, and, in fact, requiring the early establishment of express provisions. 75
3. Communist Bloc Views

The views put forward in the legal subcommittee of the U.N. Conlmittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space have found general
support in current legal literature. However, it should be noted that
the academic literature coming from the Communist bloc countries
is not always in agreement with the views expressed in the Free
World. Soviet interest in the matter of liability has been incidental
until quite recently, and early Soviet views were concerned almost
entirely with such issues as sovereignty and security. 76
74 In the absence of such an agreement, claims against the United States
for an extraterritorial or foreign catastrophe would be subject to existing law.
See Financial Protection, supra note 5, at 42-47. Under existing international
law, an international tribunal could "hold the United States liable to a state
whose nationals were injured by its activity, whether this liability were predicated on a theory of absolute liability or one which entailed a greater balancing of interests." Ibid., 85-86.
7 5 Discussions under the auspices of the U.~. Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space were conducted in GeneYa during :!\larch 1964.
76 Survey of Space Law, supra note 20, at 32-33. Compare, Lipson, Outer
Space and International Law 12-21 (1!)5~). Crane bas noted instances of Soviet
concern in Soviet publications dating from 1956 for alleged damages caused
on the ground by space vehicles. He has also noted Soviet contentions that
damages have been caused by the nuclear contamination of space, copper
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l{orovin, 'vriting in 1959, took passing note of the problem of
liability. A:fter observing that launches up to that time had been
"solely under the auspices o:£ governmental bodies * * *" he asserted
that ":full responsibility :for eventual damage lies 'vith the Government concerned in the event o:£ personal or property losses :for citizens
o:£ :foreign countries." 77 In this connection he held that "all universally accepted rules o:£ international law (inadmissibility o:£ the
use o:£ :force in solving international disputes, noninjury o:£ :foreign
citizens, and their property, governmental responsibility :for the
activities o:£ their representatives, etc.) apply to the Cosmos as
well." 78
The Polish author, Zylicz, also assumed that civil liability would
b.e related to launches by s_tates, or by international organizations,
and that "the states or the competent international organizations
should in this case be held responsible* * *"i.e., liable :for damages. 79
Another Polish author, Machowski, has examined several o:£ the important questions o:£ liability :for injury or damage :from unmanned
space vehicles. He has noted the possibility o:£ collisions between
space vehicles in outer space, o:£ interference between spacecraft or
disintegrating parts with aircra:ft in a~rspace, and o:£ damage to
persons or property on land or on the sea. It was his view that the
injured party had a right against the launching state. 80 His assumption is also that launched space vehicles 'vould be state o'vned and
considered that under international law the right to launch must
be subject to the duty to pay compensation :for resulting injuries.
His analysis goes no :further than enunciating the right and duty relationship .
. Several American analysts have provided some insight to this
Soviet view o:£ liability. "Whelan has stated that the Soviet writers
needles, spent satellites, interference with communications, arbitrary weather
control, and harms caused by "violation of the principles of peaceful co-existence governing the demilitarization of outer space." Crane, "Soviet Attitude
Toward International Space Law," 56 A.J.I.L. 707 (1962). Compare Kucherov,
"The USSR and Sovereignty in Outer Space," Bulletin, Institute for the Study
of the USSR 25-33 (February 1965).
77 Korovin, "International Status of Cosmic Space," International Affairs
(Moscow) 56 (January 1959) ; Legal Problems of Space Exploration, A Sytnposium 1067.
7 8 Ibid., 1070.
79 Zylicz,
"Some Problems of Astronautical Law," Revue Generale de
D_roit International Public 663-664 (October-December 1958); Legal Problems
of Space Exploration, A Symposium 1162.
80 Machowski, "The Legal Status of Unmanned Space Vehicles," Second
Colloquium 117; Legal Problems of Space Exploration, A Sytnposiutn 1211.
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have accepted the principle that a state is liable for personal and
material damages caused by space vehicles because the same principle
prevails in Soviet domestic legislation for damages caused by Soviet
vehicles in their national airspace. 81 At the time his conclusion was
reached, Article 78 of the Soviet Air Code82 and Article 404 of the
Soviet Civil Code governed such liability, yet claimants were denied
damages presumably because of their intentional conduct or gross
negligence. 'Vhelan therefore speculated that it was conceivable the
Soviets 'vould "accept full responsibility of the state for damages
caused by its outer space vehicles," 83 but also suggested that the
reciprocal application of this vie'v might be limited by the nature
of the conduct of a claimant. Basing his interpretation on a 1961
article by Korovin, 84 Whelan considered that Soviet acceptance of
liability might be contingent upon whether the spacecraft of the
claimant state had been previously engaged in civilian and peaceful
81

Whelan, "Soviet Attitude Toward International Law and Outer Space,''"
in Soviet Space Programs: Organia;ation, Plans, Goal.s, and International Implications, 87th Oong., 2nd Sess., 209 (1962).
sz Section 78 of the August 7, 1935 code provided: "Any institution, enterprise, organization, or person exploiting a civil aircraft shall be liable, under
the laws of the Soviet Union * * * to repair damages caused by death or
bodily i~juries to passengers during the takeoff, flight, and landing, as well
as damages caused by injuries to property or persons not carried by aircraft,.
unless it is proved that the injury occurred as a consequence of the intent
or gross negligence of the injured person himself." Air Laws and Treatiesof the World, Committee on Science and Astronautics, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.,.
1318 (1961). Significant changes were made in 1962 Soviet domestic legislation. According to Crane "Article 90 of the 1962 U.S.S.R. Civil Oode provides
for liability for injury resulting from extra-hazardous activities unless caused
by force tnajeure (similar to the common-law concept of 'act of God') or by
the intent of the injured party. Article 101 of the 1962 U.S.S.R. Air Code,.
on the other hand, provides for liability regardless of force majeure, although
in cases of force majeure there is no liability where there is intent or gross
negligence on the part of the injured." "The principal pertinent changes in
the 1962 codes are the elimination of gross negligence as a defense in Art. 9()
of the U.S.S.R. Civil Code and the addition of gross negligence as a defense
for cases of force rnajeure only in Art. 101 of the U.S.S.R. Air Code." Crane,.
supra note 76, at 709 and footnote 84.
83 'Vhelan, op. cit., 210. Crane has concluded that after the amendments
"an analogy with Soviet domestic law would support absolute liability for
damage caused by Soviet space vehicles." Crane, supra note 76, at 709. Compare Pepin, "Damage to Third Parties on the Surface Caused by Space
Vehicles," Third Colloquium 132.
84 Korovin, "Space Exploration and International Relations, A Discussion,'"
International Affairs (Moscow) 61-62 (June 1961).
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pursuits rather than those of an "aggressive" nature. 85 This implies
that if a claim were filed by a state against the Soviet Union for
da1nages caused by a Soviet space vehicle, the Soviet Union would
take into account its interpretation of the nature of the space activities of the claimant state in determining if it would concede
liability. 86
It is clear that the Soviets prefer the process of negotiation to
the use of legal institutions in resolving international disputes since
the former makes it possible for the country to veto any previously
accepted agreement fixing the existence and amount of liability.
Crane has pointed out that "The significance of this emphasis on
dispute-settlement will depend on the extent to 'vhich the problem of
damages has been integrated into over-all Communist global strategy,
just as has· every other problem and area, of Soviet space law." 87
4. Free World Views: Individuals
By contrast, the Free 'Vorld publicists have been interested in the
development of a series of substantive legal rules having applicability
to practical space situations. The typical approach has visualized a
comprehensive legal order for space activities somewhat paralleling
existing air and sea practices as regulated by custom and international conventions. Typical of this approach have been the suggestions
of Jenks, who has taken into account a comprehensive list of situations dealt with by conventional law. He has sought to relate such
respo~ses to space law. Thus, he has suggested, in so far as the matter of liability is concerned, that benefit might be derived from noting
possible analogies to the provisions of the Rome Convention of 1952
on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface, to the International Code of Signals, to the International Collision Regulations annexed to the International Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea, and to the Navigation Code of the Air consti85

Whelan, op. cit., 210-211; Crane, supra note 76, at 708-709.
Crane concurs with Whelan's conclusion that the Soviets may additionally
require that the problem of return of space vehicles and personnel be related
to liability. According to Crane "it is not clear whether the Soviets consider
that the right of a nation-specifically the U.S.S.R.-to the return or recovery
of its spacecraft should be made conditional upon the acceptance by that
nation of liability for injury or damage caused by such spacecraft, or whether,
to the contrary, the acceptance of liability should be made contingent upon
recognition by the other countries of a duty to return the vehicle." Crane,
supra note 76, at 708.
87
Crane, supra note 76, at 710. However, in General Assembly Resolution
1962 (XVIII) of December 24, 1963, the Soviets were able to agree to a statement of principles acceptable to the United States. See Annex 4, infra, p.
450.
86
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tuted by the annexes to the International Civil Aviation Convention.88
Western writers, who generally emphasize the nature of the activity rather than the place of its occurrence, have sought to clarify
such problems as: the basis or bases for liability in the event of
space activity damage,89 \vhether liability should be imposed on those
who have launched space devices or whether it should extend beyond
the factor of launch to operation and use, 90 \vhether such form of
liability as may be agreed on (based on the standard of strict or
absolute liability, or fault, or negligence, etc.) should be primarily
that of a state, association of states, or international organization,91
88 Jenks, "International Law and Space Activities in Space," 5 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 105 (January, 1956) ; Legal Problems
of Space EaJploration, A Symposium 38-39.
89 Haley, supra note 1, at 296. Hingorani, supra note 13, at 214. Simeone,
8upra note 8, at 52. :1\lankiewicz, supra note 13, at 209. Verschoor, supra
note 12, at 103. Vallado, "The Law of Interplanetary Space," Second Colloquium 163. Beresford, supra note 58, at 153-155. Cooper, supra note 13, at
143. The foregoing have been in agreement that the standard of strict liability
should apply to damages occurring on the ground, on the sea, and in airspace
as a result of space activities. The rationale has been that at the present time
space activities constitute extrahazardous dangers. Wright has supported this
result with the maxim sic utere tuo ut non alienum laedas, and has written
that states "must prevent the launching of missiles or satellites which might
land in foreign territory or on the high seas, or, alternatively, assume full
responsibility to repair damage to other states consequent upon such landing."
Wright, "Subversive Intervention," 54 A.J.I.L. 528 (1960). This view is supported by holdings in the Trail Smelter Case, 1941, U.S. Arbitration Series
36, 35 A.J.I.L. 684 (1941), and in the Corfu Channel Case (Merits), 1949,
I. C. J. Reports 4, 22. Compare Briggs, The Law of Nations 310, 2nd ed.,
(1952), l\lcDougal and Schlei, "Th~ Hydrogen Bomb Test in Perspective,
Lawful :1\leasures for Security," 64 Yale Law Journal 682 ff. (1955), Regala,
"Legal Problems Arising from the Use of Unmanned Earth Satellites," 33
Philippine Law Journal 645 (1958), Schachter, "Comments,'' 1958 Proceedings
of the American Society of International Law 247.
90 Verschoor, "Observations on Comparing the Responsibility for Damage
IY Space Craft and that Caused by Nuclear Installations and Nuclear Powered
Ships," Fourth Colloquium 333 ( 1963). It was noted that the operator in most
instances would be a state. The Davies draft takes note that where a collision takes place in outer space, the operating state (as distinguished from
the launching or state responsible for launch) might reasonably be required
to bear its own loss. Davies Draft Code of Rules on the Exploration and
Uses of Outer Space 16. Compare the statements made by the representative
of the United Kingdom to the legal subcommittee. Supra, p. 360-361.
91 Cooper, supra note 13, at 144. Cooper assumes that states will either launch
or authorize the launching of space vehicles. Hingorani, supra note 13, at 216,
also believes that the launching state must assume liability. Rivoire, "Design
for a Law of Space," First Colloqui1un 101, has advanced the view that ope_ra-
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·whether the same standard should be applied to events occurring on
the ground, on the sea, in the airspace or in outer space, 92 the special
problem of collision of spacecraft in outer space,93 the nature of acts
or events constituting damage, 94 limits, if any, on the amount of dam'tions might be. conducted by a Space Agency, and that it would be liable for
damages under certain conditions. Rega_la, supra note 89, at 645. l\fachowski,
supra note 80, at 117, has asked if the doctrine of sovereignty would prevent
national liability. Presumably it could be one of the purposes of an international ·convention to . eliminate such a defense. According to Cooper "it
seems doubtful whether launching States will agree both to waive sovereign
immunity and to consent to be sued in foreign courts." Ibid. The UN discussions have been based on the concept of international responsibility.
Supra, pp. 352ff.
92 Coop~r has urged the acceptance of the standard of absolu~e liability
on the part .of the launching state for dainage on the surface · and .in . airspace. However, h~ would apply the standard of negligence to damage in
outer space. Supra note 13, ~t 134. Beresford has noted also , that "proof of
negligence is apt to be very difficult. Not onl:r may the necessary evidence
be complex and technical, but it may be known only to the Government,_ap.d
protected by rules of military security." Supra note 58~ - at 153. Thus he
f?upports the view that "liability without fault for personal injury and property damage to third parties on the ground" sh~uld be accepted. Ibid., 155.
However, this does. not take into account damages to spacecraft resulting
.from collisions in outer space. In this connection it may be noted that Gerlach
has, stated that the cbances of collision between spacecraft are "practically
nil." "Contribution," First Colloquium 67, Compare B.e resford, supra note 13,
at 242. However, the fact remains that such collisions or accidents· may
occur between space objects while in outer space. Consequently, General Assembly Resolution 1962 (8) provided tha_t "Each State which launches or
procures the launching of an object into outer space, and each State from
whose territory or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for
damage to a foreign State or to its natural or juridical persons by such
object or its ,component parts ~n the earth, in air space, or in outer space."
93 Such collisions might be with natural objects, such as celestial bodies
or meteors. It could involve contact with other spacecraft. Such contact
could be either intentional or accidental. Verschoor bas suggested that a
launching state might claim nonliability on the grounds of force maje~tre where
there had been an "unfores~en collisio~ with a meteor." Supra , note 12, at
.103: ·Mankiewicz has urg~ch.t;he acceptance of the standard of absolute liability
for ''t.hose_ who control-the launching of the space vehicle or the activities for
which" it is u~ed .II= *. *" . [~nd] that. the ." same principle should . apply to whatever . damage is caus~d by a space . :vehicle or a - sp~~e activity, jrrespective of
.tJ'le kind of the damage and the place wh,~_re it occurs." Supra note. 13, at ~09210. Compare Haley, supra note 1, at 299-300.
~ •'.
9 4 Most of the commentators ~ave discussed :Q.arm as the produ~t of tangible
destructiop. or injury to perf?ons a~d property, such as toxic harm resulting
from inhalation of fumes from fuel, or destruction of property from explosion
or collision, or personal injury or death resulting from being struck by parts
!
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ages, 95 the i1nplementation of international agreen1ents in national
la,vs, 96 the jurisdiction of national courts over claims for damage, 97
of a space vehicle or debris. Harm may take varying forms. Keating has
noted the possibility of trespass by satellite. "Space Law and the Fourth
Din1ension of Our .A.ge," First Colloquium, 87. Presumably this would take into
account unsanctioned movement through a nation's airspace, and would raise
the question of the reasonable measure of damage. In view of the fact that
small satellites might make several or more orbits before being consumed in
the atmosphere or landing, the measure of damages, if any, would have to
consider the number of trespasses. Spent satellites may have a life expectancy of many years with a resulting interference with the proposed orbits
of new satellities. This fact might be considered as a basis for damage,
particularly when such satellites continued to transmit radio signals causing
interference with frequencies allocated to other users by the International
Telecommunications Union. Lyon, supra note 20, at 284. Noise may become
a basis for liability.
9 5 There is general agreement that the conventions dealing with the liability
for aircraft damage are inapplicable to space vehicles. Proposals range from
full responsibility to limited liability. Comparisons have been made with
liability for nuclear disaster where under the Price-Anderson amendments to
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 the maximum figure of $500,000,000 has been
fixed for indemnification in connection with each domestic nuclear incident.
See Financial Protection Against Risks of Jf ajor H ann in Government Progra1ns 17; Verschoor, supra note 12, at 103; Haley, supra note 1, at 294.
Beresford has noted that the OEEC draft convention on liability arising from
nuclear risks fixes a limit of $15,000,000 and that "as a practical matter, damages must probaby be limited since States are not likely to assume unlimited
liability. On the other hand, the limit of damages should be set high enough
to compensate litigants for the greatest injury or loss that can be reasonably
expected." Supra note 58, at 154. However, under the OEEC draft, a state
may be permitted to limit liability to $5,000,000. Compare, Verschoor, supra
note 90, at 332.
96 This is essentially a national problem and depends on whether the international convention is or is not self-executing. In order to a void uncertainties
it may be desirable to specify in the convention that it is self-executing,
that is, does not require implementing legislation. Or, certain provisions could
be described as self-executing. In the United States there has been much
attention given to the contents of treaties in order to ascertain if they fall
into one of these categories, for example, the U.N. Charter. See Hudson,
"Charter Provisions on Human Rights in American Law," 44 A.J.I.L. 543
( 1950) ; Evans, "Some Aspects of the Problem of Self-Executing Treaties,"
44 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 68 (1~51).
Wright, "National Courts and Human Rights-the Fujii Case," 45 A.J.l.L. 62
(1951). Preuss, "Some Aspects of the Human Rights Provisions of the Charter
and their Execution in the United States," 46 A.J.I.L. 289 (1952).
9 ; Financial Protection Against R·isks of Jfajor Harm in Government 7-8,
42-43, 78-84. Leonard; "The United States as a Litigant in Foreign Courts,"
G2 Proceedings of the American Society of I;tter_n~'tional ·L~w 101-102 (1958).
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the extent to "~hich a state might pursue claims against the entity
causing the harm, 98 and the process 'vhereby international responsibility 1night be established. 99
5. Free World Vie·ws: Groups

The problems of liability have attracted the attention of several
pro1ninent international groups. In 1961, at the 12th Conference of
the Inter-American Bar Association, a Magna Carta of Space was
adopted in 'vhich that body favored the view that "In the event
of injuries or death to persons or damage to property caused by
space vehicles, rockets, missiles, satellites and the like, the sovereign
po,ver by or through which they have been launched shall be responsible and liable for all such damage ""'ithout the requirement of any
proof of fault, negligence, carelessness or recklessness." 100
The Con1mittee on Aeronautics of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York has suggested some tentative vie,vs in a pro9 8 See Note 93, supra.
Cooper has urged recovery to include damage to
individuals and damage suffered by a state. Supra note 13, at 144.
99 Judicial processes, such as the International Court of Justice, have been
preferred. Rauchhaupt, "'Vorld Space Law," Second Colloquiurn 127, has suggested an appropriate international court either connected with the World
Court or a separate one as in the case of the Coal and Steel Community. He
has also noted the suitability of arbitration. "The Problem of Damages in
Space Law," Third Colloquium 136. Weinmann and H. C. ~fcDougall have
considered diplomatic negotiations, voluntary arbitration, or the 'Vorld Court
to be -appropriate methods. "The Law of Space," 35 Foreign Service Journal
22 (April 1958). For an analysis of problems involved in the use of national
commissions for settling international claims, see Lillich, International Claims:
Their Adjudication by National Commissions (1962).
Cooper has said that where claims arise from collision or other damage
in outer space states "should have the right to invoke the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice." Supra note 13, at 144. Beresford has urged that the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court be used,
and that claims heard there should include harms suffered both by states
and by private persons. As an alternative he has noted the possibility of
arbitration, "either by a permanent commission or by ad hoc commissions
composed of representatives from the countries concerned." He has noted
the difficulties involved in suits in the municipal courts of the nation responsible for the harm. Supra note 58, at 155. Compare, Report to the United
Nations General Assembly, United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/4141, 23; Legal Problents of Space Exploration, A Symposium. 1269.

100 Resolutions, Recommendations, and Declarations .Adopted by The Twelfth
Conference of the Inter-Amer-ican Bar Association 4 (1961). In 1964 the

leaders of this body were critical of General Assembly Resolution 1962 (XYIII)
as not going far enough in establishing rules on liability. Los Angeles Times,
April 6, 1964.
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visional draft agreement. Its proposal provided that the participating
states would "consider that injury or damage caused by space activities should, subject to any limits to be specified in the future, be
reimbursed, regardless of fault, by the State or States responsible for
the space activity." 101 The Bar group noted the need for express
agreement on the "incidence and possible limits of liability, the
procedures for obtaining rein1bursement, liability in case of collision,
and the possible desirability of regular contributions by States or
other organizations engaged in space activities to an international
:fund out of which such reimbursement might be claimed." 102
The Davies Draft Code of Rules, 'vhich took into account the
possibility that a private person might be licensed to engage in space
activity, placed responsibility for space harms squarely on the public
launching entity. Paragraph 6 of the draft provided:
·
6.1 The State or States or international body responsible
:for the launching of a spacecraft shall be liable for any breach
of the Draft Code in which it may be involved, for an·y -injury
or loss caused by the spacecraft, or any part of it
a. by physical impact, contamination, or other,vise, to any
person or property whatsoever outside the territory of the States
responsible for the flight of the spac_e craft;
b. as a result of collision or navig~tional interference to any
aircraft,
·
1. in the airspace of another State: or
2. of a nationality other than that of the spacecraft, without proof of negligence in the operation of the spacecraft
being required. 103
.
The proponents of this rule urged that states should bear their own
loss for the damage resulting from the collision _of spacecraft in
outer space, but was qualified that if by agreement a state were
i~equired to give prior notice of a launch and failed to do so, a valid
basis for assigning liability to the noncomplying state existed .....t\.ddi_tionally, sin~e contamination might take several forms, including
radiation and microorganisms returned to earth by space vehicles
Forum, on Space Law 12 (~larch 24, 1960).
Ibid. As to indemnification see Financi.aZ Protection Against Risks of
1.-Jajor Harm in Government Programs 16-19, 50-53. The Inter-American Bar
101
1o2

Association plan called for the establishment of an international insurance
fund to provide for compensation for harms.
1o3

Davies Draft Oode of Rules on the Exploration and Uses bf Outer Space

16. The proposal suggested a ceiling of fifty million dollars for liability for
injury or loss.
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1vhich had been in contact 'vith celestial bodies, the need for an
international body to enforce claims was also foreseen. 104
~Ieyer has reported the findings of the Legal Committee of the
Gern1an Scientific Society for Air Navigation which, in 1962, coli~
siclered the question of liability: for dan1ages caused by spacecraft.J.os
It was their vie'v that tort liability should be imposed on the operator of a spacecraft, and that 'vhere such craft was engaged in -flight
to the surface of the earth or in airspace, the rule of absolute liability
"'" as to be imposed on any collisions between aircraft and spacecraft.
In the event of a collision in outer space, liability 'vas to depend on
proof of fault, but by reason of the difficulty of ~uch proof, this ap ..
proach 'vould result in ~ach operator's bearing its own ldss: The
group considered ~that "contributory negligence of the person who·
suffers da1nages or of his servants or agents reduces the compensation or excludes it entirely." 106 The group also· considered such issues
as: that liability should be limited, that every operator n1ust provide
evidence of insurance up to a given (but unstated) amount, that in
the event of a private entity's tort, such person might be sued in the
national courts where the injury took place, that if such an injury
resulted in a stateless territory (such as the high seas), the private
litigant might sue in the courts of the state of which he 'vere a national, and that appeals might be taken _to the World Court. The
latter Court 'vas considered to be the for-qm _for interstate .disputes,
and \vas to have exclusive jurisdiction 'vhere the amount of the claim
exceeded the limits of a state's insurance or the guarantee fund ~ set
up to compensate those harmed.
The German Legal Committee took note of the need for an international convention ·which would establish the conditions under
'vhich outer space activities would be subject to license by a state~
According to it, state liability should extend to harms occurring in
the territory of a state, on and over the high seas, and in outer space .
. .£\. clai1n might be maintained by a person whose state had not become
a party to the convention. Opposition 'vas expressed to the vie'v that
an injured person should be entitled to pursue his clai1n against his
o'vn state 'vhen the harm was caused by another state's operator pursuant to some pre-established right of the former to have recourse
against the latter. It 'vas thought to be more practical to "channel the
liability to the operator of the spacecraft to a certain maxirp.u1n; and
1 04

Ibid., 16-17.
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then to require the Contracting State "~hich licensed the spacecraft
to assun1e liability for the damages in excess of the limits." 107
Fron1 all of the foregoing, there is strong reason for believing that
international la 'vyers accept the vie'v that a state may be held to
account for torts committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of
that state. 108 There is clearly an urgent need for an international
convention to fix the details. It is particularly necessary to establish
the liability of such international corporate bodies as groups of states
and international organizations. As Jenks has noted "there re1nains
the question 'vhether its liability should be regarded as arising under
and being n1easured by the la'v of the territory 'vhere the da1nage or
injury is suffered or should be determined by an international
standard." 109 Until an appropriate international convention, buttressed by national legislation, makes specific provision for the
myriad of tort problems arising fro1n activities in space, the general
consensus as to the substance of rights and duties 1nay fail to afford
real protection. 110 It would be 'vell to fix reasonable conventional
rules prior to an event requiring the ascertainment of individual
rights and the nature of international duties. Until this happens
states "Till rely heavily on the principles of General Asse1nbly Resolution 1962 (XVIII).
B. POSSESSORY RIGHTS, ASSISTANCE TO PERSONNEL .AND
RETURN OF PERSONNEL AND SPACE VEHICLES
I. Possessory Rights

At an earlier stage in the development of the myriad uses of space
vehicles, and at a time during 'vhich control of the vehicle after
launch 'vas less sophisticated than at present, there 'vas son1e inclination to draw an analogy bet,veen spacecraft after launch and a fired
Ibid., 346. Compare Verscboor, supra note 90, at 331-333, where notice
is taken of the need for a statute of limitations on the filing of claims.
1 os C<>mpare, Trail Smelter Arbitration, 35 A.J.I.L. 684 (1941).
See also the
Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. Reports 4, 22.
109 Jenks, The Proper Law of International Organizations 224, 219-220
( 1962).
110 Bilateral conventions may be used where there is a high degree of
probability that one state's activities may be injurious to another state. For
example, the United States and Australia entered into an agreement on
"Sampling of Radioactivity of Upper Atmosphere by l\1eans of Balloons" relating to operations conducted in Australia. The two countries agreed that to
the extent Australia was not otherwise compensated by the United States, the
Atomic Energy Commission of the United States would indemnify Australia
against "{a) claims in the form of judgments rendered or settlements ap107
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bullet, over 'v hich it was suggested the firer no longer exercised property or possessory rights. 111 Others were quick to compare the space
vehicle 'vith a baseball or a golf ball with the view that they, like
the bullet, were aimed, but unlike the bullet were intended to come
again into the possession of the player for future and additional
use. 112 The assumed inability or limited ability of the launcher to
control the space vehicle after launch suggested the possibility that
the vehicle, at least by implication, 'vas to be considered as having
been abandoned. It was soon realized that such vehicles, and to a
lesser extent the launching mechanism 'vhich followed the vehicle
into space or orbit, 'vere subject to some management from the
ground. v·Vith the develop1nent of many i1nprovements in command
systeins, particularly 'vith the perfection of the manned satellite and
techniques employed in deep space probes, the measure of their control and proprietary attitudes have been substantially increased. 113
- Many factors have influenced the conclusion that the launcher,
operator, or user of a space vehicle (and presumably its accompanying launching device) retained o"~nershi p and possession of the vehicle or device. For example, no express abandonment has ever been
recorded and there have been no implied abandonments. Rather,
there has been much national pride in the fact that "our" satellite was
launched successfully on a given date. Haley has expressed the view
that for space vehicles legal abandonment can not take place where
"the intent to abandon is lacking." 114
l\1any factual considerations support the view that a launch does
not constitute an intentional abandonment of property and possessory
rights. The extraordinary value of the launched item, the identifyproved in advance by [the AIDC] * * * for public liability arising out of
or in connection with the program, and (b) the reasonable costs of investigating and settling such claims, and defending suits for damage for such
public liability provided, however, that this indemnification is subject to the
availability of appropriated funds to the [AEC] * * * " TIAS 4739.
111 Becker, Hearings Before House Select Oontmittee on Astronautics and
Space Exploration, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1275 ( 1958).
112 Knauth, "Legal Problems of Outer Space in Relation to the United
Nations," Legal Problems of Space Exploration, A Syntposium 254-255.
113 However, Pierce has stated that "Space payloads and command systems
have been sadly fallible in practice." "Hazards of Communication Satellites,"
17 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 183 (1961) ; Haley has stated that "No
object should be placed in any orbit in outer space which cannot be guided
back to earth or destroyed by some other means, such as being guided into
the surface of the sun." "Survey of Legal Opinion on Extraterrestrial Jurisdiction," Third Colloquium 47. Compare, Bush, letter to The New York Ti1nes,
November 22, 1963.
114 Haley, supra note 1, at 309.
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ing syn1bols affixed to the vehicle and device, the placing of }:luman
beings on board,115 the significant efforts to recover both manned and
unmanned vehicles either from. the ocea:q_s. or by seizing the vehicles
while still in the air, all lead to this result. Com1nenators have been
quick to compare a manned spacecraft with manned aircraft a:nd
have noted continuing ownership over aircraft during flight and
after l~nding at a f9reign .airfield.
,
The U.S. Congress h.a9 made provision for conforming to certain
procedures if government property is to be abandoned. In Haley'$
vie'v "while mi~~iles and similar devices may be 'abandoned' in the
physical sense, there can be no abandonment which transfers title to
another person unless the statutory methods of abandonment a-re
con1plied with." ~ 16 , Thus, from the point of view of the -municipal
law of the United States, abandon1nent of these publicly owned vehl.-cles and devices cannot take place, and it .would not be possible to
support a contention t~at a lawful finder could exist. At the international level, however, the most plau.sible argument for return of
these rehicles would be based on t:qe analogy of aircraft, particularly
where it had been agreed tha.t the_spacecraft had been employed for
peaceful, i.e., nonaggres~ive and beneficial, uses.
It might also be argued that there is a .relationship between the
.doctrine of absolute liability _for space torts and ownership of the
vehicle or launching device. To permit a state to deny ownership of
a Yehicle or device launched, used, or operated by it might result in
a claim by such state that it was under no duty to use care in the
course of such launch, use, or operation. This could lead to a chaotic,
rather tha:q. a stru~tured, regi~e for outer space involving a refusal
to report launchings, disregard for radio regulations, and other procedures necessary for the Inaximum exploitation and use of outer
space for peaceful purposes. For these, and other reasons, 117 a working
consensus exists which assures to those engaged in the launch, use,
or operation of space vehicles a'n d devices full property and possessory rights in such equipment so long .as it is used for peaceful purposes.118
.

-

It has been suggested that the duty of the state to the astronaut includes
both 'the providing of a safe place for space transit and the retention of the
data situated within the spacecraft, and hence the craft itself. Cocca, "Legal
Status of the .Astronaut," Fourth Colloquium 146.
116 Haley, supra note 1, at 309.
111 Lyon, supra note 20, at 282. Lyon has suggested that the vehicle might
be regarded as a "detached part of its national territory, subject to national
la,v, whether it be governable or ·not, manned or unmanned."
11s co·i:npare the Soviet' writer, Galina, "On the Question of Interplanetary
Law," Legal Problems oj Space Exploration, A Sy~nposium 1057:
11 5
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The nature of the consensus may be determined by examining
United States and Soviet proposals at the United Nations. On December 8, 1962, the United States suggested, along with other principles contained in its draft declaration, that "Ownership and property rights in a space vehicle and its components remain unaffected
in outer space or upon return to the earth." 119
On April 16, 1963, the Soviet Union submitted a revised draft
declaration of basic principles to the legal subcommittee. In paragraph 8 it was suggested that "States shall retain their sovereign
rights over objects they launch into outer space. Rights of o'vnership
in respect of objects launched into outer space and their components
remain unaffected while they are in outer space and upon their return to earth." 120
The major difference, other than the Soviet reference to "sovereignty," has to do with the description of items placed in space. The
United States expression "space vehicle and its components," is a
more restricted term than "objects" and "their components." It becomes a matter of definition, and in an express international agreement on this subject it might be desirable to employ the term "space
device" as contained in the Belgian vVorking Paper on the Unification of Certain Rules Governing Liability for Damage Caused by
119

N.N; Doc. A/C.1/881, 3. Annex 10, infra, pp. 459-460. In September 1963,
the United States representative at the United Nations told the Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space that there should be "the retention by
the launching authority of jurisdiction over the ownership of space vehicles."
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.20, 18.
120 U.N. Doc. A/ AC.105/C.2;L.6a. Annex 16, infra, pp. 466-468.
In September
1963, the Soviet delegate told the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
that its April 16, 1963 revised draft declaration of basic principles had
"adopted the United States wording with regard to the inalienable right of
ownership of States to objects launched by them in space." U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/PV.20, 37. He also said that it was "universally accepted that the
sovereign rights of States with regard to objects launched by them into space
is preserved." Ibid., 41. The earlier Soviet Declaration of the Basic Principles Governing the Activities of States Pertaining to the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space is U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/L.2; U.N. Doc. A/5181, Annex III,
intra, pp. 480-482, Annex 21. With the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 1962 (7) (XVIII) on December 24, 1963, a well defined principle was
established. This portion of the Resolution provided "The State on whose
registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdic~ion and control over such object, and any personnel thereon, while in outer
spa~e.
Ownership of objects launched into outer space, and of their component parts, is not affected by their passage through outer space or by their
return to the earth_. Such objects or component parts found beyond the limits
of the State of registry shall be returned to that State, which shall furnish
identifying data upon request prior to return."
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Space \ 7 ehicles where it was defined as "any device which is intended
to move in space, remaining there by n1eans other than the reaction
of the air." 121
There is, of course, the additional proble1n of whether ownership
-if recognized internationally-will result automatically in the return of a space vehicle used for peaceful purposes. Efforts have been
1nade, notably by the Soviet Union, to connect the right to return a
space vehicle to the requesting state with provision for pay1nent of
dan1ages caused by the requesting state or its persons to the state to
which the request for return is directed. This view was not incorporated into Resolution 1962 (X\TIII).
2. Assistance to Personnel and Return of Personnel and
Space Vehicles

The 1959 United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space pointed to the need for express international
agree1nents, on a bilateral and multilateral basis, to regulate assistance to space personnel and return of such personnel and space
vehicles to the responsible entity. It was noted that a structured
regin1e was required for both manned and unmanned vehicles and
for accidental as well as planned landings. The committee stated
"among the subjects that n1ight be covered by such agree1nents
"~ould be the return to the launching State of the vehicle itself-and
in the case of a maimed vehicle-provision for the speedy return
of personnel." 1'22 It was the view of the committee that certain
"substantive rules of international law already exist concerning
rights and duties with respect to aircraft and airmen landing on
foreign territory through accident, mistake or distress. The opinion
was expressed that such rules might be applied in the event of similar landings of space vehicles." 1 '23
The United States, on Dece1nber 8, 1962, submitted to the First
Co1nmittee on the u.N. General . ..1\.. ssembly a Draft Declaration of
Principles Relating to the Exploration and Use of Outer Space. It
contained a principle dealing "~ith assistance and return of space
personnel and a separate principle dealing 'vith the return of _space
vehicles and their component parts. Each principle was based .on
U.N. Doc. A/AC.10:5/12, 11.
U.N. Doc. A/4141, 24. Annex 20, infra, pp. 472-480.
12 3 Ibid., 25. This referred to Annexes 12 and 13 on Search and Rescue and

1z1
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Accident In-vestigation to the International Ci-vil Aviation Con-vention. Also
pertinent is the Con-vention Promoting Safety of Life at Sea, 1936, T.S. 910,
50 Stat. 1121, and the International Con-vention for the Safety of Life at Sea,
1948, 3 UST 3450, TIAS No. 2495.
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a need resulting fron1 possible accident, distress, or mistake. The
December 1962 Draft Declaration of Principles provided in part:
4. States shall render all possible assistance to the personnel
of space vehicles 'vho may be the subject of accident or experience conditions of distress, or \vho may land by reason o£
accident, distress, or mistake. Space vehicle personnel "\vho n1ake
such a landing shall be safely and promptly returned to the
launching authority.
5. States shall return to the launching authority any space
vehicle or part that has landed by reason o£ accident, distress, or
n1istake. Upon request, the launching authority shall furnish
identifying data prior to return. 1'24
The comparable Soviet proposal of April 16, 1963, provides:
10. States shall regard cosmonauts as envoys of 1nankind
in outer space and shall render all possible assistance to spaceships and their cre,vs "\vhich may make an emergency landing
on the territory of a foreign State or on the high seas; spaceships, satellites or capsules found beyond the limits of the
launching State shall be returned to that State. 1'25
There are notable differences in the two proposals . . Ho·wever, before 1naking a comparison, it should be noted that the United States
on September 11, 1962, presented to the U.N. Com1nittee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space a Draft Proposal on Assistance to
and Return of Space Vehicles and Personnel \Vhich employed language not found in the later Draft Declaration of Principles. 1 '26
Paragraph 1 of the earlier Draft Proposal can be co1npared with
the first sentence of paragraph 4 of the Declaration of Principles,
but includes after the "\vord "mistake," the expression "or otherwise
than as planned." 127 The Draft Proposal provided that "All possible assistance shall be rendered * * ~" rather than "States shall
render all possible assistance * * *" The second sentenc~ in paragraph
4 of the Draft Declaration of Principles modified paragraph 2 o£
the Draft Proposal, 'vhich had provided that "Space vehicles-and
their personnel in the case of manned vehicles-that land by reason
of accident, distress or n1istake, or other,vise than as planned, shall
be safely and promptly returned to the State or States or international organization responsible for launching." 1'28
124

U.N. Doc. A/0.1/881, 2. Annex 10, infra, pp. 459-460.
U.N. Doc A/AC.105/C.2/L.6, 2. Annex 16, infra, pp. 466-468.
126
U.N. Doc. A/ AC.10G/L.4; U.N. Doc. A/AC.10G/12, 5. Annex 8, infra,, p.
125

458.
127
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Ibid.
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The Draft Proposal did not contain the sentence found in the
Draft Declaration of Principles providing "Upon request, the launching authority shall furnish identifying data prior to return." The
final paragraph of the Draft Proposal, nu1nber 3, provided "Any
expense incurred in providing assistance to or return of space vehicles and their personnel shall be borne by the State or States or
international organization responsible for launching." 129 This was
not contained in the Draft Declaration of Principles. These changes
make it clear that the United States "\Yished to establish a broad duty,
li1nited to states, to provide assistance, and by excluding the expression "or other"'Tise as planned" from the Draft Declaration of
Principles, sought to limit such an assistance rendering duty to conditions of accident, distress, or mistake. The December Draft Declaration of Principles made mention of the role of the launching
authority rather than "State or States or international organization
for launching." The duty to provide identifying data was added in
the December Declaration of Principles while no duty to make
compensation for assistance rendered was suggested. This latter aspect ''as a part of the earlier Draft Proposals because they would
have established a duty on the part of persons, as well as states,
associations of states, and international organizations, to engage in
assistance activities.
The detailed United States Draft Proposals, September 11, 1962,
may be compared with Articles 4 and 5 of the Draft Code for International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, submitted to the U.N. by the United Arab Republic in ~larch 1962.
These paragraphs proposed that:
4. ~!ember States agree to provide every possible assistance to
personnel of space vehicles who may be the subject of accident
or experience conditions of distress or "\Vho may land by reason
of accident, distress or mistake;
5. l\Iember States shall undertake to return to the State or international organization responsible for lalmching space vehicles
and their personne1. 13 o
These proposals are practically identical with the United States
detailed Draft Proposals except, as noted above, the United States
Draft Proposals in paragraph 3 took into account launchings by associations of states and made provision for payment of expenses
incurred in providing assistance.
Ibid.
U.N. Doa. A/AC.105/L.6; U.N. Doa. A/ AC.105/12, 7.
463-464.
12 9
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Annex 14, infra-, pp.
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The Soviet Union on September 10, 1962, also proposed a detailed
Draft International Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts and
Spaceships niaking Emergency La1~dings. 131 This detailed Draft
Agreement provided, in Article 1, that contracting states should
assist cre"~s involved in accidents, should rescue astronauts making
en1ergency landings, and that states should use all n1eans at their
disposal in achieving this dual responsibility. Article 2 suggested
that each contr~cting state 'vhich discovered a space vehicle accident
should so notify the launching state ·without delay. Article ·3 suggested that 'vhere there 'vas an emergency· landing in the territory
of a state, the launching state should be notified and the discovering
state should rescue and render assistance to the personnel. Under
Article 4, each launching state 'vas entitled to make· application to
contracting states to engage in joint search for astronauts in the
event of a presumed emergency landing on the high seas. Pursuant
to Article 5, the standa~~d of care on the part of an assisting state
was to be the same as it 'vould render to its o'vn personnel. Article
6 called for a state to "facilitate the early return to their o'vn
country of any astronauts of another Contracting State who may
make an e1nergency landing on its territ_ory or who may be rescued
on the high seas." 132
Article 7 imposed the following limits on the duty to return space
vehicles: Foreign spaceships, satellites and capsules :found by a Contracting State on its territory or salvaged on the high seas shall
be returned without delay to the launching State i:f they have
identification marks showing their national origin and i:f the
launching State has officially announced the launching o:f the
devices found.
Space vehicles aboard which devices have been discovered :for
the collection o:f intelligence information in the territory o:f another State shall not be returned. 133
The last operative article of the Soviet Dra:ft Agreement suggested
that expenses incurred by a state in :fulfilling the obligations contained in Articles 6 and 7 were to be reimbursed by the launching
state.
From the :foregoing it will be seen that in 1962·, tl~e major resource
states, supported by the United Arab Republi_c, were in general agree131 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/L.3; U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/12, 3.
Annex 15, infra, p.
464. This was submitted prior to the revised stat~ment of principles of April16,
1963. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.6. Annex 16, intra, p. 466.
13 2 U.N. Doc. A/ AC.105/L.3. Annex 15, infra, p. 464.
. 133 Ibid...
.
.
'
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ment that assistance should be rendered to astronauts endangered
by accident or other peril. There was also a general consensus that
space personnel and space vehicles should be returned, although the
United States Draft Proposals of Septe1nber 11, 1962, n1acle reference
-of return to a state, states, or international organizations, whereas
the Soviet drafts made reference only to launching states. Further,
the Soviet Draft Declaration of Basic Principles, April 16, 1963,
made reference only to the return of the space vehicle, whereas its
earlier agreement, September 10, 1962, specified both p~rsonnel and
space \ehicles. Only the Soviet Draft Agreement contained a condition which would forestall the return of space vehicles (but not
personnel), namely, the presence on such vehicle of intelligence in:fornlation gathering devices. Both the United States detailed Draft
Proposal and the Soviet detailed Draft Agreement made reference
to reimbursen1ent for expenses involved in providing assistance to
or return of personnel and spacecraft, although neither indicated
whether reimbursement was to be a condition precedent for such
return. Insofar as the United States draft of September 11, 1962,
called for the prompt return, and the Soviet Draft Agreement called
for return without delay, it would be reasonable to believe that such
rei1nbursen1ent should not be regarded as a condition precedent for
a return.
A n1ajor difference encountered between the detailed U.S. Draft
Proposal and that of the Soviet Draft Agreement had to do 1vith
the entity entitled to assistance and return. The U.S. proposal consistently referred to a launching state, states, or international organization. However, the December 1962 United States Draft Declaration of Principles referred to return to the launching authority. The
Soviets continued to propose that such rights as were under consideration belonged to states only.
To elate the resource states have linked subjects of rescue and assistance of personnel and their return with the subject of return of
space vehicles. It would appear that for manned spacecraft this is
a practical approach, and, also, that the return of unmanned spacecraft might be regulated on the same basis as prescribed for manned
vehicles.
These propositions have not received definitive analysis in the
J...~egal Subcommittee of the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, although careful attention has been given to this continuing
problem. Enough has been said to point to the need for careful
drafting of an ultimate convention on these subjects. The United
States representative noted on April ·16, 1963, that there had been
general agreement on the limited subject "that every effort should
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be made to assist and return astronauts in distress and that astronauts rescued by authorities other than the launching authorities
should be safely and promptly returned." 134 On April 24, 1963, he
noted that paragraph 5 of the United States Draft Declaration of
Principles made reference to the return of parts of space vehicles
but that paragraph 10 of the Soviet Draft Declaration of Basic
Principles made no reference to parts. He also observed that there
"\vas a difference between the United States Draft Declaration of
Principles, which called for the return of space personnel in paragraph 4, and the Soviet paragraph 10, which failed to make mention
of the matter. However, as previously noted, the detailed draft
proposals of both states called for the return of personnel and vehicles.135 Neither the Soviet Draft Declaration of Basic Principles
nor the Soviet Draft International Agreement made any mention of
the return of parts. The United States representative further observed that the U.S. vie,v, as contained in paragraph 5 of the Draft
Declaration of Principles, holding that a launching authority might
be requested to supply identifying data (not contained in the United
States detailed Draft Proposal), \Yas in fact embodied in paragraphs
4 and 5 of the UAR draft and in paragraph 10 of the Soviet Declaration of Basic Principles. 136 Neither the UAR draft nor the Soviet
Draft International Agreement made specific reference to this condition, and it is doubtful if the attribution to them was correct, although Article 7 of the Soviet detailed Draft International AgreeInent called for space vehicles to have identification marks showing
their national origin.
The Soviet representative on April 19, 1963, spoke about the favorable prospect of arriving at an international agreement on the question of "assistance and rescue." 137 It was his view that an agreement
on tllis subject might take into account the principles contained in
international agreeme:r;tts dealing with the rescue of and assistance
134 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.l6, 4. The term "launching authorities" may
be construed to mean a state, states, or an international organization.
135 Supra, pp. 458-460, 464-468. Resolution 1962 (7) and (9) (XVIII), which
was unanimously adopted hy the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 24, ;1963, resulted from these early proposals. Annex 4, infra, pp.
450-452.
136 U.N. Doa. A/AC.105/C.2j:SR.20, 12.
137 U.N. Do a. A./AC.105/C.2/SR.17, 8. This was based on the fact that "no
serious objection had been raised * ··.* *" to the general principle of the Soviet's
paragraph 10 nor to the detailed draft. However, he asserted that it would l1e
necessary to get agreement on the concepts contained in the Draft Decla~ation
of Basic Principles before any specific agreement might be entertained·. ~he
same position was stated on May 2, 1963. · U.N. ·n oa. A/AC.i05/C.2/SR.2n, 10.
.
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to aircraft and vessels in distress and their personnel. 138 On May 2,
1963, in discussing the import of paragraph 10 of the Soviet Draft
Declaration of Basic Principles, the Soviet delegate sought to enlarge and reconcile the subject of return of astronauts with the Soviet
position as contained in the Soviet detailed Draft International
..:\_greement. He brought into focus the Soviet position with respect
to the return of the parts of space vehicles by saying, "Astronauts
and the components of spaceships should assuredly be returned." 139
This new position, it must be remembered, must be interpreted in the
light of restrictions and reservations contained in the detailed Soviet
Draft International Agreement.
The Soviet representative, in linking the rescue and return of
astronauts and space vehicles as a single subject, asserted that no
detailed express convention on the subject could be arrived at until
there had been agreement with the Soviet Draft Declaration of the
Basic Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space. 140 As to the rescue and return of
astronauts and space vehicles he stated, "treatment of the problem
of return must be based on the principle that States retained their
sovereign rights over objects they launqhed into outer space, and that
rights of ownership in respect of objects launched into outer space
and their components remained unaffected while in outer space or
upon their return to the earth (A/AC.105/C.2/L.6, paragraph 8).
The duty to render all possible assistance to astronauts and spaceships which might make an emergency landing was dictated not
only by humanitarian considerations but also by the principle that
the exploration and use of outer space should be carried out for the
benefit and in the interests of the whole of mankind (ibid., paragraph 1) ." 141
On April 26, 1963, the Japanese representative took note of an
apparent consensus of the subcommittee 'vhich "seemed to be that
space vehicles which landed outside the territory of the launching
State should be promptly returned to that State." 14'2 It would have
been more accurate to state that the consensus favored assistance to
personnel and return of personnel and spacecraft and parts, subject
to United States or Soviet reservations, and that such return in the
138

U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.25, 10.

This was also the view of the representative of Austria, who noted the
availability of multilateral and bilateral agreements. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/
SR.16, 6.
140 U.N. Doc. A/ AC.105/C.2/L.6; U.N. Doc. A/ AC.105/12. Annex 16, infra,
p. 466.
14~ il:N: Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 25, ~1.
142 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.22, 12.
139
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view of the United States was not limited to the Soviet view of
states but also took into account other entities engaged in space
activities, as groups of states or international organizations.
From this point of view the appraisal of the Argentinian representative appears to have been too narrow. He told the legal subcomn1ittee that on the question of "assistance to and return of astronauts and space vehicles * * * a resolution should be prepared,
stressing * * * the singular character of the astronaut as a civilian
explorer of outer space and the duty of States to render him all
possible assistance in the event of a forced landing outside the borders of the launching State." 143 On the other hand, the Austrian
representative expressed the judgn1ent that opinion had been "unanimous that the draft declaration of basic princi pies should contain
the following principle [namely] * * * assistance should be accorded
to space vehicles and their personnel in distress." 144 The Australian
representative seems to have come somewhat closer to the vie,vs generally expressed when, in making an appraisal of the work of the
subcommittee in April and l\1ay 1963, he suggested that "there was
complete agreement in broad principle * * * that States should be
under a duty to render all possible assistance to the personnel of
a space vehicle landing by accident, distress or mistake and to return
to the launching State both personnel and vehicle." 145
However, even here there was not complete agreement. As noted
previously, the Soviet government, possibly for tactical purposes,
insisted on formulating a broad statement of general principles on
many subjects prior to negotiating a detailed agreement on assistance to astronauts in distress and return· of astronauts, space vehicles,
and component parts. 146 Further, the Japanese representative urged
that states negotiating on this subject should take into account the
prior notice of space launches. He stated that his delegation "did
not consider it reasonable or appropriate to expect a nonlaunching
State, within whose territory a space vehicle or its parts landed, to
return such objects unless it had been given advance kno,vledge
about the vehicles in transit or in orbit that might come do,vn suddenly and without warning on its territory. The obligation of the
nonlaunching States to return space vehicles should be conditional
1 43
144
145

U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.24, 10.
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.28, 3.
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.23, 3.

146

Supra

note 120, at p. 3$3.
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upon the obligation of launching States to provide adequate information in advance." 147
At the time the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space n1et
in September 1963, a clarification of ideas relating to these subjects
had resulted. According to the representative of the United States,
such areas as "assistance to astronauts in distress" and "return of
space vehicles and their personnel :forced down by accidents or
emergency" had reached the stage of "general agreen1ent." 148 The
Soviet representative indicated that "Nobody raised any objections
against such an important principle as the obligation of States to
consider cosmonauts as emissaries of humanity into space and to give
all possible help to space craft and their crews which have been
:forced down by accident on the ter.ritory of a foreign State or on
the open seas, and also to return these space craft and their crews
to the States which originally launched the1n." 149 He also took note
.of the views advanced by several delegates that the proposed U.N.
draft declaration on space law should "include a provision by ·which
States, on the territory of which a space craft actually lands, could,
before the return of the ship or the space craft, demand that identification should be given to it." 150 In order to obtain a generally acceptable draft declaration, in view of the possibility that a universally acceptable one would not be forthco1ning, he expressed
approval for making reference to such identification in the declaration.
Although a pattern is in the process of developing whereby assistance to and return of personnel is being linked with the return of
space vehicles and parts, the two subjects are in reality separate and
distinct. The return of an astronaut after having been provided with
varying forms of assistance, including the saving of his life from
.adverse elements, may be supported on basic principles of humanity.151 If he were a national of a state other than the state of launch,
147 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.22, 12. He also suggested the possibility of
improving the timing and contents reported by launching states to the United
Nations Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 1721 B
-{XVI).
148 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.20, 17-18.
149 Ibid., 41-42.
.
150 Ibid., 43.
151 Following the Soviet launch of Vostok V on June 14, 1963, and Vostok
VI on June 16, 1963, a Department of State spokesman indicated on June 18,
-1963 "that the United States would do everything it could to help rescue
·Soviet astronauts, should they come down in American territory. The department press officer * * * said he knew of no request by the Russians for such
help." New York Times, June 19, 1963.
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operation, or use-or if he were a stateless person- he would still be
entitled to receive all benefits accorded to those in danger or distress,
and upon his own request might be expected to return to the place
from whence he has departed. A launching or interested state or
group of states engaging in joint space activities, or an international
organization could be expected on humanitarian grounds to intercede
'vith the state where he had come to rest or in the hands of whose
authorities he might be found.
The return of a space vehicle or its parts would not rest on humanitarian grounds, but rather on property or possessory rights, although
the Soviet drafts have made reference also to sovereign rights to return. Return of space vehicles is encumbered with security considerations which do not appear to be involved to any significant extent
in the return of an astronaut. Thus, the Soviets have proposed that
vehicles equipped for intelligence-gathering activities (presumably
the entire vehicle, including the observational equipment) need not
be returned, and this is urged despite the conflicting principle of a
sovereign, property, or possessory right to the vehicle and its contents
after launch. The Japanese view would permit the return of astronauts even though no advance notice as to the launch, operation, or
use were conveyed to other states. However, under the Japanese
proposal, a state would have no legal right to a return of a space
vehicle or ~ts parts in the absence of prior ~ffective notification of a
launching.
While custom and usage have not been given an opportunity to
provide substance to this difficult political-legal problem, it is clear
that the humanitarian analogies contained in the law of the sea and
of airspace will unquestionably have an impact on state practice so
far as assistance to and return of astronauts is concerned. Unilateral
views of national interest will undoubtedly govern the problem of
return of vehicles and parts until a practical condition of mutual
benefit or advantage can be developed concerning such objects. When
a joint recognition of such mutual benefits or advantages is clearly
understood, it is expected that a workable express international agreement will regulate the return of vehicles and parts. The ongoing
obsession on the part of the Soviet Union with secrecy and the
gathering of observational data ("espionage" according to Soviet
writers and governmental representatives) may make it difficult to
achieve such an express agreement. However, this need not deter
other states from entering into express agreements on these-subjects.
· In September 1963; the Chairman of the Committee on Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space suggested ·that prospects were b~co~ing ··i ncreasingly more: ·favorabl~ for a resolution of the problems of assist~
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ance to astronauts and return of both astronauts and space objects.
and their parts. The following Declarations "\-vere n1ade in separate
articles of the unani1nous General Assembly Resolution of December24, 1963:
7. [O]bjects [launched into outer space] or component parts
found beyond the li1nits of the State of registry shall be returned
to that State, which shall furnish identifying data upon request
prior to return.
9. States shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind in
outer space, and shall render to them all possible assistance in
the event of accident, distress, or emergency landing on the
territory of a foreign State or on the high seas. 1-\...stronauts ''ho
make such a landing shall be safely and pron1ptly returned to
the State of registry of their space vehicle. 15'2

C. SATELLITES AND SPACE

COI\I~IUNICATIONS

The importance of this subject is seen in the fact that control overnleans of con1municating can serve the national interest in 1nany
significant and effective ways. As a means of influencing the minds.
of men and their activities-by appealing to reason or emotion-its
only serious rival is direct coercion. National security and wellbeing cannot afford to disregard the practical and legal implications
of space communications.
The precise nature of permitted space communications is a significant part of the larger problem of defining the substance of the·
concept of "peaceful uses of outer space." Although, as pointed out
above, this concept or principle has received the approval of nations,.
there still remains the very considerable task of developing reasonable working rules and legal standards for specific aspects of
legally permitted conduct.
vVith the advent of communications by satellite, either passive oractive, ·as well as reliance on radio and other devices to control
vehicles already in outer space, additional international efforts have·
been initiated. 'J:'he public international organizations, through "\vhich.
major efforts have been undertaken to maximize space communications and to provide a structured legal regime therefor, have been.
the International Telecommunications Union ( ITU) and .the United.
Nations. COSPAR, the private scientific consultative body, has
also begun to play an important role in this field.
U._N. Doc. A/RES/1962 . (XVIII). Annex 4, infra. p. 450. Compare~
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.20, 7. The use of "promptly" in paragraph 9 calls at152

tention to the fact that such a qualification is lacking in paragraph 7.
"';

.·.
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\Vhen the regulation of con1n1unications in outer space is com-pared 'vith other types of space control, one is in1mediately forced
to take account of the long experience and ongoing technical qualifications of the ITU. Since 1947 it has had the assistance of its
International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB) and its International Radio Consultative Committee ( CCIR). The ITU has
.already assumed a key role in radio communications in outer space
.and has undertaken the important responsibility of assisting in the
.assignment of radio frequencies. 153
Before analyzing the legal problems affecting space communications, it is necessary to identify uses, users, and major problems.
l\1ajor uses of telecommunications facilities fall into three primary
·classes, namely, com1nercial, military, and scientific. These involve
the use of such specific facilities as radio, television, data transmis·.sion, telephone, and telegraph. All involve the rapid dissemination
·of information over immense distances. These capabilities, when applied to active or passive satellites or other space vehicles, permit
ihe performance of such vital functions as tracking, guidance, radio
positioning, telemetering, and increasingly accurate control. Additionally, the techniques of radio astronomy have made it possible
to acquire scientific data from the wide and distant ranges of space.
The users of space comn1unications include not only the resource
.states which have demonstrated an ability to launch, operate, and
use space vehicles, but also a great variety of public and private
·entities 'vhich have already participated, in varying degrees, in the
1nanagement of space communications. These include states, associations of states, international organizations, and private legal per:sons (private companies, corporations, and individuals). The latter
·engage in both national and international activities and a great
variety of forms are employed in any single state. In the United
:S tates, for example, there are both private and public communications operations, and combinations thereof, and it may be possible
to have both military and nonmilitary 1nanagen1ent of them. In
-other states, exclusive n1ilitary management may be the preferred
operational technique. · Even 'vhere states 1nonopolize this function,
however, operations are frequently carried qn by both civil and military ad1ninistrations.
The development of space com1nunications coincidental 'vith the
development of space vehicles has added ne,v, but not necessarily
Int1·a, pp. 396-400. The IFRB engaged in technical preparations for the
1963 Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference on Space Communications, and the CCIR through its Study Group IV has engaged in special studies
of space telecommunications systems and of radio astronomy.
153
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dissilnilar, problen1s fron1 those communications problems experienced in the past. ''Tith the development of spacecraft there has
becon1e a greater a'Yareness of the need to use space communications. This a'Yareness has presented a finite situation disclosing the
need for careful connnercial, scientific, and military analyses of all
factors ·which must be considered in assigning radio frequencies.
The entire regime of world-wide communications was constructed
on the basis of seeking to avoid harmful interference. Ho·wever,
with the advent of the space vehicle, the Soviet Union began to use
radio frequencies previously assigned to other users. This resulted
in i1npaired reception and impeded radio astronomy. Furthern1ore,
capabilities for jam1ning foreign broadcasts either at source or at the
point of reception have long existed. The impact of these factors
upon n1ilitary security and the needs of national self-defense, has
not gone unnoticed. In addition to the problem of frequency assignments ''hich ''ill be beneficial to states, there has also been the
problem of effecting allocations between differing uses within a given
state, i.e., commercial, scientific, and military. ~faking acceptable
assignments of frequencies at an early stage is necessary in order
that suitable equipment capable of performing a variety of assigned technical tasks may be manufactured. Confusion as to assigned frequencies-or ·worse yet, no assign1nent at all-would defeat
the maximum beneficial use of space comn1unications facilities.
The seriousness of these problems was noted by Congressn1an
Brooks, in 1961, when he stated in referring to the allocation of radio
frequencies for space use: "Frequencies have been used in violation
of treaty provisions, and transmissions have continued, interfering
''i th normal communications, long after their purpose had been
served. Looking to the future, 've can see a coming 'war' of the
radio-frequency spectrum. In effect, the spectrun1 is a scarce natural
resource, already overloaded, which will be required to carry more
and more traffic. The growing overload will come not only from
military but from scientific and commercial use. Rapid coininunications ·will be needed an1ong an increasing number of points for production, transportation, and other economic activities. In outer space,
unless agreement is reached on frequency allocations, the information acquired by difficult and costly experiments may well be lost." 154
154 Brooks, "The Place of Government in the Utilization of Space," in Ramo,
ed., supra note 2, at 209. The ITU's role with respect to radio frequencies is
that of a coordinator rather than a manager of details. The conventions dealing
with radio divide states into regions in such a way as to avoid the prospect
of national interference. They also divide various kinds of services, such as
amateur, broadcasting, or maritime mobile. Over-all frequency bands are allo-
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Haley has documented the early Soviet use of frequencies at 20.005
and 40.002 megacycles in connection with Sputniks I and II which
were launched in 1957. He has observed that "The first departure
from the rules and regulations pro1nulgated pursuant to international treaties, was occasioned by the USSR's use of the frequencies
of 20.005 and 40.002 megcycles (me)." 155
The magnitude of the difficulties resulting from failure to conform
to frequency allocations has been commented on by many authorities. ~ir. Frederick R. Kappel, president of the American Telephone
and Telegraph Company has stated:
These questions are both domestic and international. Some of
the most crucial arise from the fact that to communicate via
satellite it is necessary to use radio frequencies in huge quantities. The radio-frequency spectrum is of course a natural resource, and the frequencies that can be used for satellite communications are limited. The best area is from roughly 1,000
to 15,000 megacycles, with son1e possibility also of using the
range from 15,000 to 20,000. In the extremely high frequency
range, rain blocks off trans1nission. In the lower range, sky
noise increases, and besides, big bundles of frequencies are already in use.
cated to the various services with an indication as to whether they may be
used world-wide or regionally. States make the detailed assignments to users
within their respective jurisdictions, and this decision is the product of regional agreements among adjacent states. There are three ITU regions, i.e.,.
Region I, "\Vestern Europe, U.S.S.R. and Africa; Region II, the "\Vestern Hemisphere; and, Region III, Asia excluding the Soviet Union. In order to avoid
frequency interference the ITU has sought to allocate nonadjacent bands in the·
spectrum to different kinds of service. Thus, the major processes to avoid
interference are to grant spectrum occupancy on the basis of region and frequency. Another means is to effect allocations for fixed periods of time of
broadcast. "\Vith the advent of the space age the ITU, in 1959, designated
"use" as another basis for allocation, and made reference to allocations for
space research.
155 Haley, "Space Age Presents Immediate Legal Problems," First Golloquiutn
14. He said "On no occasion did the USSR apply to the appropriate agencies:
of the International Telecommunication Union at Geneva for permission tQo
use the frequencies * * *. [t]he appropriate agencies of the * * * Union 'vere·
not officially notified of the use of these frequencies by the Sputniks." Ibid.
15. The Soviet Union is a member of ITU. Compare, Haley, "Law of Outer
Space--Radio Controls Urgently Needed," Space Law, A Syn~posiutn 458;
Haley, "A Basic Program for the 1963 Extraordinary Administrative Radio·
Conference on Space Communications," Legal Problems ot Space Exploration,
A Symposium 694-695; Bloomfield, "The Prospects for Law and Order." in
Bloomfield, ed., Outer Space 169 (1962).
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Obviously, satellite co1nn1unication systems 1nust not interfere
with each other, and matters must also be arranged so that other
uses of microw·ave radio--uses that have nothing to do 'vith
satellites-,vill not interfere 'vith and overpower the faint signals fron1 space. 156
Fro1n the point of vie'v of liinitations i1nposed on pure research, the
views of Goldberg are pertinent. He has said that "~ian-made interference caused by radio transmitters on the earth and in satellites
constitutes the Inost serious kind of threat to radio astronomy from
w·hich it 1nay be possible to escape by putting radio astronomy observatories on the other side of the moon." 157 In order to forestall unreasonable radio interferences with space activities, the United
States K avy has engaged in the use of intricate electronics syste1ns
to detect radio interference 'vith satellite launching operations.
Naval aircraft "make antenna pattern and/ or miscellaneous field
strength measurements, using radio interference and field intensity
1neters 'vith associated open recorders, in their primary role as frequency interference control." 158
Interference with assigned frequencies may take several forn1s. It
may be the product of inadequate equipment so that broadcasts are
unable to maintain the allocated wave lengths. The interference may
result even 'vhen suitable equipment is used because of a belief that
broadcasts on shared frequency assignments will be minimal as a
result of distances bet,veen broadcast points or other considerations.
On the other hand, the interference may be intentional-i.e., jamIning. J am1ning n1ay take several forms such as efforts to prevent
reception of broadcasts in the territory of the state doing the jam156 Kappel, "Communications in the Space Age," in Ramo, ed., supra note 2,
at 52; Compare, Berkner, "Space Research-A Permanent Peacetime Activity,"
in Ramo, ed., supra note 2~ at 4.
· 157 Goldberg, "Studying the Universe from a . Space Platform" in Ramo, ed.,
8upra note 2, at 130. The conflict between scientific and commercial uses of
radio frequencies comes into focus with regard to radio astronomy research,
particularly when conventional radio services 1nay be requested to vacate
assigned bands with the possible abandonment of costly equipment. This in
turn would require difficult negotiations to establish new commercial frequencies. "Policy Planning for Space Telecommunications," and "Radio Frequency
Control in Space Telecommunications," Oomrnittee on Aeronautics and Space
Sciences, U.S. Senate, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1960. For two important recent
studies of space communications see Haley, Space Law and Got·ernntent 159232 (1963), and Reiger, Nichols, Early and Dews, Co-mmunications Satellites:
'l'echnology, Economics, and Systen~ Choices 1 (1963).
158 Cantwell, "Pacific l\Iissile Range," 5 Navy, The Magazine of Sea Power
25 (December 1962).
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ming, or in other areas. This may be accomplished either by jamming the broadcast at its source or at the point of rec~ption. Jam~
ming radio transmissions passing through superjacent airspace or
outer space in order to forestall receipt of the broadcast by the intended receiver is also possible-especially when the intended re~
ceiver is situated at a place other than on the surface of the earth
or within the territory of the jamming state. Such efforts are generally considered to be politically n1otivated and reflect the protection of such i1nportant national interests as peace, security, selfdefense, , ideological preferences, and perhaps others. Such efforts
contribute to closed societies. .
Important legal considerations condition and affect jamming procedures. Where nationally licensed broadcasts fail to conform to
ITU promulgated frequencies, either by reason of inadequate broadcast equipment or by reason of intentional departure . fro1n such
allocations, a prima facie case of breach of treaty or convention
would exist. As in any other express agreement, the principle of
pacta sunt servanda would be applicable. A state having received
frequency allocations has the duty .to require all operators within
its territory-licensed. or 11nlicensecl-to conform to such allocations
and to its in1plementing national la·ws . .Frequency allocation agreen1,ents, being based on the exchange of bargained benefits and detriments, constitute the basis for valid rights and duties.
The .1959 Geneva ITU. Radio Regulations promulgated frequency
assignments for space and earth-space services. These were ·restricted to use for research purposes only, and no definition ot research was made. 159 However, these frequencies 'vere typical in that
.they were allocated subject to a duty to avoid "harmful interference
to the services rendered by the stations of another country." 160 In
this regard, it has been suggested that research purposes would not
include "navigation, ·weather reporting, and commercial communications." 161
159
·

160

ITU Radio Regulations and Additional Protocol, Geneva 1959, TIAS 4~93.
Ibid., Article 3 "General Rules for the Assignment and Use of Frequen-

cies," especially paragraphs 113-117. As noted previously, the duty to avoid
"harmful interference" with frequency assignments is fundamental. to regula ted
broadcasts.
161 Estep and Kearse, "Space Communications and the Law: Adequate International Control after 1963 ?" 60 lJfichigan Law Review 887 (1962). The
authors qualify the foregoing by observing, "It has been suggested that these
systems would not be forbidden per se, but merely would not be given protection and would be required to protect from harmful interference the services
operating according to ITU' Radio Regulations. See Glazer, "The Law-~1aking
Treaties of the International Telecommunication Union Through Time and in
Space," 60 lJfichigan Law Review at 290, n. 72. Ibid., 887, n. 63.
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The 1959 Regulations also 1nade provision for the enforce1nent of
allocations. Article 15 is entitled "Procedure in a Case of Harmful
Interference," and Article 16 deals with "Reports of Infringements."
\Vhen the infringed-upon state notifies the infringing state of an
interference, the latter is obliged to stop the interference. If the
infringing state does not end the interference, paragraph 716 of
Article 15 provides that "the ad1ninistration concerned shall forward
details of the case to the International Frequency Registration Board
for its information." 162
Since harmful interference 1nay be intentional as 'vell as unintentional or accidental, and since the ITU possesses no effective
coercive means to forestall or eliminate such unpermitted conduct,
injured states and other users are obliged to look elsew·here for the
effective redress of grievances. Outer space communications are
complicated by the fact that space vehicles may be manned as well
as u1nnanned, and harmful interference with co1n1nunications by
anyone for "~hatever cause could seriously prejudice the life of the
astronaut, as 'vell as the success of his mission. There would be little
time to resolve the matter in a judicial or quasi-legislative-executive
forum, such as the \\Torld Court or the United Nations. Reciprocal
conduct against the entity engaging in or permitting the interference might not be possible, if it did not have the same or similar
kind of satellite in orbit. Jamming of the interfering broadcast
would probably not be helpful, but might, in fact, make communication 'vith the subject astronaut or space vehicle all the more difficult.
Meticulous adherence to assigned frequencies, based on the expectation of reciprocal benefit, 'vould seem to be required under such
circumstances. The easy availability of unilateral measures will provide for respect for spectrum allocations.
On the other hand, where there is a grave suspicion on the part
of a state that the space vehicle--either 1nanned or unmanned-is engaged in a nonpeaceful purpose, i.e., an aggressive and nonbeneficial
activity, then a for1n of radio interference 'vould unquestionably be
considered to be a minimum reasonable response to the actual or a pparent harm to national security. Under the assumed condition of
extreme provocation, it is clear that even more drastic action 'vould
be permitted to the threatened state on the basis of its inherent
right of self -defense.
TIAS 4893. Pursuant to Article 9, Section VII, the Board may make
studies and recommendations. The aggrieved state may, under certain conditions, be able to obtain new frequencies. Neither the Board nor the ITU is
equipped to prevent a state from continuing a harmful interference.
16 2
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I-Io,veYer, a more difficult proble1n is to determine under what con~ditions, if any, there may be a legal interference with radio broad-casts, either to or from space vehicles, "'"hen there appears to be no
reasonable prospect of aggressiYe national conduct. The Soviet position relating to purported propaganda broadcasts has already been
noted. 163 Further, the Soviet Union has recorded its opposition to
observational activities of space vehicles, and has labele4 such conduct "espionage," and has put forward a view-generally unsupported-that such observational activity is in violation of international la 'v .164 Jamming would most probably be resorted to in both
instances, but probably 'vith less practical effect in the latter instance
because space vehicles can store up recorded data for transmissional
release upon command under favorable circumstances. However, it
1nay be anticipated that, as time goes on, technological means may
be used to forestall either the storing or the read-out processes.
Some guidance may be obtained on this issue from the work of
the United Nations and from customary international law. The report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
July 14, 1959, assigned a high priority to the allocation of radio
frequencies for peaceful spa,ce uses. It stated :
13. It " ras recognized that there are stringent technical limits
on the availability of radio frequencies for com1nunications. The
development of space vehicles will pose new and increasing demands on the radio spectrum. It was emphasized that rational
allocation of frequencies for communications with and among
space vehicles 'vould be imperative. In this way, what might
other,vise come to constitute paralysing interference among radio
transmissions could be avoided.
15 . .~..l\..ttention should also be given to the desirability of terminating transmissions fro1n space Tehicles once these transmissions have outlived their usefulness. Such a measure would
help conserve and make optimum use of the frequencies which
are assigned for space communications. In considering this problein, it 'vould be necessary to balance this factor against the
interest in conserving a means for continuous identification of
space vehicles. 165
Supra, pp. 271-275, 295-300.
164 Supra, pp. 271-295, 368.
165 U.N. Doc. A/4141, 24.
Annex 20, infra, p. 472.
163

Paragraph 14 called attention to the capabilities of the ITU. 'Vith respect to signals emanating from
spacecraft, it is generally thought that these may be given a life of many
hundreds of years.
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.. In1ple1nentation of these recommendations has become the special
responsibility .of the U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space. _I t has sought to stress the need for a structured legal regime
for space con1n1unications by receiving national proposals and
through discussions which have been largely conducted in its scientific and technical subco1nmittee. The proposed principles have been
formulated in the 1nost general terms, unlike proposals for the rescue of astronauts, apparently based on the view that the ITU is
responsible for promulgating detailed regulations.
Thus, the United States Draft Declaration of Principles Relating
to the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, December 8, 1962,
commends to states for their guidance that:
l. Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration
and use by all States, on the basis of equal rights, in conformity
"~ith international law; [and]
2. In the exploration and use of outer space and celestial
bodies, States are bourid by the relevant rules of international
law and the relevant provisions of international treaties and
agreements including the Charter of the United Nations. 166
By reference to international agreements, the provisions of the ITU
conventions dealing with harmful interference must be taken into
account. Further1nore, under the Charter considerations affecting
the 1naintenance of international peace and security and self -defense
must also be considered as applicable.
The Draft Declaration of Basic Principles Governing the Activities of States Pertaining to the Exploration and Use of Outer Space
submitted by the United ICingdom on December 4, 1962, also has
general relevancy~ Article 1 provided:
Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and
use by all States in conformity ·with international la"~· This
freedo1n shall include free navigation by means of space vehicles, the establishment of space stations and other like devices,
the conduct of scientific research, and the landing on and exploration of celestial bodies, and shall be exercised by all States
''ith due regard to the interests of other States in the exploration and use of outer space, and to the need for consultation
and co-operation bet"~een States in relation to such exploration
and use. 167
The U.IC. proposal also noted the applicability of the Charter, international la,v, and "other international agrecn1ents which may be
166
167

U.N. Doc. A/0.1/881. Annex 10, infra, p. 459.
U.N. Doc. A/0.1/879. Annex 18, infra, p. 469.
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applicable," 168 This proposal has taken into account the practical
problems involved in the use and exploration o£ outer space, and
clearly indicates that space activities can not be conducted successfully without employing adequate and effective communications facilities. "\Vnile due notice is taken o£ the role o£ the ITU, the affirmative need to protect, facilitate, and enlarge space communications
capabilities is recognized in this draft.
The draft Code £or International Co-operation in the Peaceful
Uses o£ Outer Space submitted by the United Arab Republic in
March 1962, also broadly suggested principles respecting space comnlunications. The Code sought to establish the following points £or
guidance:
1. The activities o£ Member States in outer space should be
confined solely to the peace_£ul uses ;
2. In their policies toward outer space l\fember States should
promote international peace and co-operation. 169
The general tenor o£ these three proposals £a vors the broad use o£
outer space £or peaceful purposes, and subsumes the £act that effective use must take into .account the presence o£ adequate communications facilities. All illustrate a strong conviction that activities undertaken must be based on a reciprocity o£ interests, including due
regard £or the interests o£ others.
The Soviet Draft Declaration o£ the Basic Principles Governing
the . A. ctivities o£ States in the Exploration and Use o£ Outer Space,
as an1ended in April 1963, incorporated 1nany o£ the points noted in
the United States, United Kingdom, and UAR proposals. However,
no reference was made to the applicability o£ pertinent international
agreements other than the U.N. Charter. Two Soviet views call £or
special comment. First, paragr~ph 5 provided that "The use o£
outer space £or propagating war, national or racial hatred or enmity
between nations is inadmissible." 170 As noted previously, this suggestion is based on the Soviet policy o£ maintaining a closed society,
and involves the very serious legal difficulty o£ realizing an acceptable internationally sponsored definition o£ the substance o£ "propagating" or "propaganda." 1 ! 1 Secol).d, paragraph 6 o£ the Soviet
proposal contained the following language: "Any measures.. that
·· · , 169 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/L.6. Annex 14, infra; p. 463.
1 70 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.6.
Annex 16, infra, p. 466. The earlier Soviet
views are contained in U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2. Annex 21, infra, p. 480.
111 Supra, pp. 221-229, 271-275, 295-300.
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n1ight in any "~ ay hinder the exploration or use of outer space for
peaceful purposes by other countries may be iinplemented only after
prior discussion of and agreement upon such measures bet,veen the
countries concerned.~' 172 \Vhile this provision was apparently ai1ned
at the ''Test Ford copper needle project of the United States,173 it
1night also se r,~e as a means of forestalling and interdicting harmful
interference \Yith peaceful uses of co1n1nunications facilities in outer
space.
General Asse1nbly Resolutions relating to the peaceful uses of
outer space have not 1nade specific provision for co1n1nunications
practices by space vehicles. ~ onetheless, R.esolutions 1721 (X\TI),
1802 (X\TII), and 1962 (XVIII) anticipated the fullest use of
comn1unications capabilities for the successful use and exploration of
outer space. Thus, the 1961 Resolution of the General .A--sseinbly,
1721 (XVI), announced support for the ITU's progran1 of allocating radio frequencies for outer space activities and expressed the
belief that communications by "means of satellites should be available to the nations of the world as soon as practicable on a global
and non-discriminatory basis." . A.t this time the U.N. also expressed
an interest in an effective communications system so that the organization and the specialized agencies might employ such facilities
for operational and informational requirements.
The 1962 Resolution 1802 (XVII), also recognized the role of the
ITU in the advancement of efficient space communications. The
Resolution took account of the fact that "communication by satellite
offers great benefits to mankind, as it "~ill permit the expansion of
radio, telephone and television transmissions, including the broadcast of United K ations activities, thus facilitating contact a1nong the
peoples of the world." In 1962, as in 1961, the General Assembly
acknowledged that it was of utmost importance that the ITU allocate
radio frequency bands for space facilities adequate to meet expected
outer space needs.
\Vith this encouragement the Space Radio Communication
Conference of the ITU, officially known as the Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference of the International Telecommunica11z
173

U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.6.
Supra, pp. 302-304, 314. The Soviet Union like the United States, bas en-

gaged in high-altitude nuclear tests. The United States bas, through its Argus experiment, obtained data related to military activities. The problems of reviewing in advance with the international scientific community prospective experiments is considered in a study conducted by the United States Space Science
Board. ".A. Review of Space Research,'' Publication No. 1019, National Academy
of Sciences-National Research Council 16-14, 16-15 (1962).

405

tion Union to Allocate Frequency Bands for Space Radio Communications, met in Geneva in October and November 1963. The
purpose of the conference has been described by Congressman
Harris of Arizona, 'vho attended, as seeking to "secure agreement
internationally with respect to the allocation of frequencies in the
radio spectrum for satellite communications, space research, navigational satellites, meteorological satellites, telecommand, telemetry,
tracking of space vehicles, amateur radio, and radio astronomy." 174
The achieve1nents of the conference 'vere noted by President
J(ennedy on N ove1nber 20, 1963, at 1vhich time he called attention to
the fact that frequencies had been allocated for the foregoing purposes and that procedures had been adopted governing the use of
such frequencies. 175 The An1erican delegation concluded that the
various allocations '"'ere necessary to the development of a single
global commercial space con1munications system, with nondiscriminatory access open to all nations, as well as to the advancement of the
foregoing space needs. 176
The conference agreed to set aside 2800 megacycles for communications satellite services, some 1200 more than intitally suggested by
the Soviet Union. Further, the conference decided that such allocations should be available for immediate use, subject, as was typical,
to the monitoring of actual use by the ITU's International Frequency
Registration Board. 177
Ambassador Joseph H. McConnell, chairman of the United States
delegation, summed up the need for an effective international understanding on frequency allocations when he stated that the
"orderly development and operation of the space programs of the
United States and other nations will depend in large measure on
the agreements reached at this conference. Adequate communications, protected from harmful interference, are essential to continued
progress." 178 Regrettably, for the first time in the history of international radio regulation a Western Hemisphere (region 2) nation
(Cuba) , refused to accept the radio frequency allocations agreed to
by other Western Hemisphere nations. According to Ambassador
174

110 Congressional Record 160 (January 9, 1964).
Ibid. Radio astronomy was allocated exclusive use of the 1400-1427 Mc/s
band. ITU Press Release 51, (October 29, 1963).
176 Ibid.
177 Ibid., 162.
178
The communication-satellite service allocation, consisting of 2,675 megacycles on eleven bands, almost all of which must be shared with existing services, is set forth for regions 1, 2, and 3 at ibid., 170. The Western Hemisphere
consists of region 2.
175
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l\fcConnell, the United States 'vas reluctantly obliged to file a reservation to the Cuban action. He stated that "because of in1portant
radio and space operations in the Caribbean area which are dependent upon frequency bands agreed to throughout the he1nisphere, the
U.S. delegation could not place the United States in the position of
having to honor Cuban radio operations which do not conforn1 to
the frequency allocations acceptable to all other delegations fro1n
region 2." 179
The December 24, 1963 Resolution of the U.N. General Assembly,
1962 (XVIII), expressed only in general terms that body's substantial interest in an effective system of communications 'vith space
objects. Nonetheless, the 1963 principles 'vhich had been the product
of extended discussion and consideration over a period of years included the solemn declaration that "4. The activities of States· in
the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried on in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United
Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and
security and pron1oting international co-operation and understanding." The liability provisions of the 1963 Resolution asserted that
.states bear "international responsibility for national activities in
outer space, 'vhether carried on by governmental agencies or by
non-governmental entities * * *. The activities of non-governn1ental
entities in outer space shall require authorization and continuing
·supervision by the State concerned." Paragraph 8 of the resolution
provided that 'vhere a space object causes harm a condition of international liability-for damages 'vill exist. Although no discussions,
other than on the subject of propaganda, have been held relating to
the har1ns resulting from an i1nproper use of communications on
board such an object, as contrasted with the object per se, it could
'vell be that this principle is adequate to cover situations other than
those of physical collision or impact directly causing har~ or damage.
Further, Article 6 of the 1963 Resolution sets forth the principle
that "In the exploration and use of outer space, States shall be guided
by the principle of co-operation and mutual assistance and shall
conduct all their activities in outer space· with due regard for the
corresponding interests of other states." At the very least this would
require consultation between states as to the prospect of misuse of
179

The United States indicated in the additional protocol, as a part of the
final act of the conference, its declaration that it could not accept "any obligation to observe the exception claimed by Cuba in those ·footnotes to th~ table
of frequency allocations which were adopted by the present conference and
'vhich specifically named Cuba." Ibid., 173.
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allocated radio frequencies and communications systems. The ITU
provides an institutional means 'vhereby cooperative procedures may
be used in order to maximize radio and other communications facilities in outer space.
However, as is well known, the Soviet government has demonstrated much concern that radio broadcasts might carry propaganda
type information. Although assurance against such conduct was
announced as a principle of acceptable space conduct in the 1963
General Assembly Resolution, it has been the practice of some states,
including the Soviet Union, to engage in jamming procedures for
ground-to-ground radio broadcasts.
At this time there appears to exist some doubt as to what type of
"material" may be broadcast and what type of transmissions a receiving state may object to. Until such details can be agreed upon,
it would appear that the traditional practices will continue, namely,
states will accept responsibility for maintaining circuit discipline,
thereby preventing and punishing gross distortions which might result in loss of life at sea, in the air, or in outer space, but they will
continue to determine for themselves the content of broadcasts which
will remain unregulated and uncensored. Receiving states confronted
with policies of secrecy and with ac~entuated notions of a communications "right of privacy" will endeavor to engage in jamming
procedures to prevent broadcasts coming down to them from outer
space. Other states may endeavor to interdict transmissions through
their airspace.
The vagueness of the legal situation is suggested by Estep and
J(earse who have analyzed the customary international law inhibiting
"transgression by radio-waves." 180 It is their conclusion that it is
an "accepted principle of customary international law that a state
has the right to object to transgression of its territory of offensive
radiowaves of foreign origin." 181 The means of protest according to
these authors are restricted to diplomatic protest or to interference
'vith the transgressor's radio signal, e.g., by jamming. In this connection they state:
.
The latter is the state's only unilaterally effective means of
enforcing its sovereign right to exclude a signal from its territory. The right to jam bears with it the duty, so far as possible,
180 Estep and Kearse, supra note 161, at 876. A dictionary definition of
"transgression" suggests "violation, infringement, breaking" and a "transgressor" as one who has "stepped across." These authors have explored the writings
of Briggs, Hyde, Jessup and Taubenfeld, Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, and Stenuit,
ibid., at footnotes 8-10.
181 Ibid.
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not to transmit with so much power that reception of the signal
is prevented in other states; however, it has been suggested that
if reception in other innocent states is interrupted unavoidably,
the right to jam has not been abused. Moreover, a state is entitled to jam an offending signal even though its jamming signal
must obliterate radio communication on that frequency within
the territory from which the transmission emanates. 182
These authors suggest two theories on which a state could support
jamming in order to inhibit the presence within the responding state
of offensive radiowaves of foreign origin. Under the first theory,
jamming would be a valid national response to the invasion by a
foreign state of its sovereignty in its superjacent airspace. Under
the second, such jamming might be undertaken in the interests of national security, based on the premise that a state may punish crimes
against its security even though they may be instituted outside of
the territory of the harmed state.
The first theory is regarded as inadequate by its proponents who
argue that "to base the right to jam solely on the ownership of airspace is to assume a context artificial for the purposes of regulating
radio transmission. Since radiowa ves do not in fact observe airspace
as a controlling boundary, airspace alone should not govern the
right to use or jam the1n." 183 Whatever the merit this theory may
possess for airspace, it is completely inapplicable in the present context, since the airspace is not outer space, and different legal conditions prevail. While states exercise sovereign control over their
superjacent .airspace, it is generally recognized that outer space is
res communis omnium. As such, like the high seas, it is available to
all for peaceful use, and subject to such controls as may be established under international law. The theory is also inadequate to the
needs of space law in that it deals with radio broadcasts emanating
from the territories of states, whereas much radio broadcasting
affecting outer space and terrestrial areas will emanate not from
land, on the sea, or in the air, but will come from very distant points
in outer space.
The theory of protecting national security by means of jamming
appears to be a sounder one, particularly when there has been a
careful delineation of occasions where collective action will be preferred over unilateral action. The security theory focuses on the
182

Ibid. It is their view that the jamming by one state of another state's

internal radio broadcasts at a time when radio was the only available means
by which a government could communicate with its own nationals at home is
a clear violation of international law.
183

Ibid., 877.
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nature or quality of the signal rather than the place from whence
it emanates or the medium through which it passes. Thus, if a radio
signal or a series of them were to constitute a grave and unacceptable
threat to the security of a state, the ·inherent right of self-defense
recognized in Article 51 o:f the U.N. Charter could be relied on in
support of the response by jamming.
Pursuant to this theory, the response by jamming might be instituted against the unpermitted signal after transmission had been
initiated and, on the basis of all reasonable facts, might also be
employed in a preventive or precautionary manner prior to any
actual transmission. It has been suggested that the direct jamming
of another state would result in a violation o:f the latter's sovereign
rights. 184 However, this need not impose a paralyzing limitation
upon the state which is seeking to protect itself. The fact that legal
principles appear to be opposed to each other merely calls for the
impressing of significant values on such principles so that no unreasonable or unpermitted harm need befall any state. This is recognized by Estep and Kearse who state that "Only if the offending
broadcast were an act of the other government or condoned by the
government would it seem that a direct jamming of the transmission
'vould not constitute a breach of the duty * * * not to infringe on
the sovereignty of another state." 185
Where the offending broadcast is initiated from a satellite in outer
space, and jamming is applied to such a transmission, it would appear that there would not be an infringement on the sovereignty of
the broadcasting state. This is true even though there seems to be
general agreement that the launching, operating, or using entity
retains both property and possessory rights in the orbiting vehicle
both while it is in space as well as when it has come to rest on land
or water surfaces of the earth. The same legal principle of security
would apply to radio spectrum management involving the transmission of signals from within one state to another and to transmissions
from one operating satellite to another, or to the· earth. Since the
product of effective interruption of communications is the same
whether the transmission is initiated on or within the territory o:f a
state or in outer space, the legal result should also be the same. Tllis
can be realized by recognizing the inherent right of self-defense. It
might also be supported by the right to maintain international peace
and security. The right in this context would be implemented by
recognition of the power to jam unreasonable broadcasts both because
of the substance and because of use of nonauthorized broadcast
184
1 85

Ibid., 878.
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bands. The provocation " ·ould have . to be actual, or imminently
threatened, aggressive conduct; the responsive defensive action would
have to be reasonable and proportionate to the threat. 186
The prospect that states may deem it necessary to engage in the
jamming of broadcasts to and from satellites in outer space is so
bleakly probable that many commentators have called for the negotiation of express agreements specifically relating the principle of
peaceful uses of outer space to such broadcast capabilities. These
proposals are based on the premise that there is a need to improve
the existing self-enforcing terms of the ITU Radio Regulations,
which largely depend upon disruptive radio conduct as a response
to nonconformity on the part of a violating state.
Proposals for a structured legal regime in outer space for radio,
resulting from the employment of satellite communications, place
central emphasis on the duty of launching states to register satellites
and satellite radio data with the United Nations. Glazer has suggested the following considerations :
In order to qualify for the protections set forth in the ITU
Convention and Service Regulations, nations involved in launching space vehicles would be required to furnish the United
Nations with technical details of the vehicles or systems to be
launched and their intended purposes. Upon approval of such
purposes, the United Nations would 'register' the vehicle or
system. Radio signatures for 'registered' vehicles or systems
would be provided by the ITU and the vehicles or systems
identified in an official international document through publication of their frequencies, and their orbital and other technical characteristics. Vehicles or systems not 'registered' by the
United Nations would be deemed by operation of law as containing 'military radio installations,' and as such not entitled to
protection from harmful radio interference whether caused deliberately or unintentionally. Abuses caused by 'registered'
vehicles or systems could be corrected by revoking through
notice and publication their international radio signatures, after
exhaustion of administrative due process and a right of appeal
to the International Court of J ustice. 187
Furthermore, Haley has summarized this need by stating that "vVi thin the framework of the pertinent international treaties, lawful use
For a more detailed development of this rationale see supra, pp. 341-351.
Glazer, supra note 161 at 314-315. Compare l\IcDougal and Lipson, "Perspectives for a Law of Outer Space," 52 A.J.I.L. 430-431 (1958) ; Estep and
Kearse, supra note 161 at 894-899.
186
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must be made of radio frequencies for all forms of astronautical
communications." 188
Efforts have been made to bring into focus in international forums
the serious problems confronting the users of space communications
in their varied scientific, commercial, and military uses. As reported
above, the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 20,
1961, in the well-known resolution entitled "International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space," took into account the fact
that communication "by means of satellites should be available to
the nations of the world as soon as practicable on a global and nondiscriminatory basis." 189 The resolution took note of the need for
effective communications by space satellites, the role of the ITU in
conjunction with such international organizations or agencies as the
U.N.'s Special Fund, the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, UNESCO, and COSPAR. The resolution expressed the satisfaction of the General Assembly that in 1963, the ITU would hold a
special conference "to make allocations of radio frequency bands for
outer space activities." 190 As a result of the resolution the ITU has
prepared reports for the U.N. Economic and Social Council and for
the General Assembly. These reports have been made available to
the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, and on several
occasions a representative of the ITU has appeared before the latter
committee or the First Committee to explain the objectives of the
1963 ITU Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference. On one
occasion the ITU representative referred to the 1963 conference as a
technical one and that the "technicians of the various members of
the Union who will participate in it will obviously be experts on
frequency assignments, which, of course, is the prime object of the
conference." 191 In 1962 the ITU representative indicated that "the
n1ain task of the Conference will be to consider the allocation of
radio frequency bands for operational earth satellite systems, to188 Haley, supra note 1, at 46; compare, Haley, supra note 155, at 14-25;
Haley, "Space Exploration-the Problems of Today, Tomorrow and in tbe
Future," Second Colloquium 53-57; Haley, "Report of Working Group VII,"
Fourth Colloquium 396-405.
189 U.N. Doc. A/5100; Resolution 1721 D (XVI).
190 Ibid.
The 1962 General Assembly Resolution 1802 (XVII), expressed the
view that "it is of utmost importance that this Conference make allocations
of radio frequ{lncy bands sufficient to meet expected outer space needs." U.N.
Doc. A/RES/1802 (XVII). Annex 3, infra, p. 446.
191 U.N. Doc . .A./C.l/PV.1291, 37.
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gether ""ith bands for telemetry command and control facilities
necessary for such systems." 192
The U.N. has also been kept advised of developments in space
communications through the International Council of Scientific
Unions' Committee on Space Research. COSPAR, in conjunction
'vith other of ICSU's committees, such as the International Scientific
Radio Union, the International Astronomical Union, and the International Union for Geology and Geophysics, has displayed much
interest in the development of systems of space communications, and
has been used to provide technical information to both of the subcoinmittees of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
COSPAR has also worked closely with the ITU, and was permitted
to send an observer to the 1959 Ordinary Administrative Conference
of that body. Subsequently, COSPAR was granted permission to
"·ork with the ITU's International Radio Consultative Committee,
particularly in the fields of space systems and ionospheric propagation.193 COSPAR's influence is extensive not only because of its
liaison with ITU and the U.N., but primarily because the national
scientists included in its membership exchange information on a
"rorld-wide basis and are influential in the consultations carried on
in every state.
The ITU has received the confidence and respect of its member
states. 194 This 'vas also demonstrated in the 1962 Dryden-Blagonravov understandings relating to cooperation in communications
experiments by means of a United States Echo type satellite. The
agreement took particular note of the role of the ITU and made
provision for a program "for the working out with other nations of
The ITU submitted a report to the U.N.
in 1062 as a result of Resolution 1721 D (XVI). U.N. Doc. E/3645. "The report stresses the fact that telecommunication is not only involved and essential
in practically all uses of outer space, but that space systems will provide new
telecommunication facilities for terrestrial requirements, new meteorological
data to be used in improved weather forecasting and new navigational aid
facilities for ships and aircraft." U.N. Doc. A/5181, 2. Attention was also
called to relay satellites, direct broadcasts to earth from satellites, radio
astronomy, and allocation of bands for telemetry and the foregoing purposes.
1n 2 COSPAR Information Bulletin 4-5 (June 1060). COSPAR also maintains a working group on tracking and telemetry with a subgroup on Radio
Tracking and Telemetry.
194 This is clearly borne out by the discussions conducted in the scientific and
technical subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
in 1962 and subsequently. U.N. Docs. A/AC.105/C.1/SR.1 and follo\ving.
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a project for an experimental global system of space communications
with due regard to the recommendations of the ITU." 195
There has been recognition on the part of Soviet bloc writers of
the need for an orderly legal regime for radio communications in
outer space. One writer has called attention to the need to "secure
an interference-free operation of radio equipment on spaceships and
satellites and to a void interference with other radio stations on the
Earth by stations from space." 196 A leading American observer of
Soviet space law attitudes has summarized the Soviet viewpoints:
(1) allocation of radio frequencies is an acute problem of
common concern to all nations, particularly to the Soviet Union
and the United States; (2) success or failure of scientific space
exploration and the application of its results depend critically
on a solution of this problem; (3) the Soviet Union has been
fully aware of the potential value of space communications and
has encouraged its development; ( 4) the principle of sovereignty
is the most important element in Soviet thinking on the legal
aspects of space communications; ( 5) the Soviets assert the right
of unrestricted use of radio frequencies so long as no harm to
other states can be proven; ( 6) yet, owing to the complexities
of space communications, they presumably hold, at least in the
view of Dr. Busak, that multilatera1 conventions will be needed
when the problem becomes acute; and (7) the universally acknowledged complexities of space communications suggest the
possibility that future international agreement may be reached
if vital Soviet political interests dictate such a course, thereby
contributing to an emerging body of international space law. 197
The position of the United States was put forward in 1963, by
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Gardner.. He has cited the
Communications Satellite Act of 1962 as defining United States
objectives in space communications.198 This statute has demonstrated
the interest of the United States in the early operation of a com195

U.N. Doc. A/0.1/880, 5. The agreement also contained the following language: "Telecommunications by means of satellites is expected to lead to a
considerable improvement of communications facilities all over the world and
can be a most important contribution to the extension of contacts and friendship among nations." Ibid., 3.
196 Busak, "Radio Communications in Outer Space," Legal Problents of Space
Exploration, A Symposium 1127.
197 Kucherov, "Soviet Attitude toward International Law and Outer Space,"
Chapter VI in Soviet Space Programs, supra note 82, at 215. The Kucherov
reference to Busak is cited in the preceding footnote.
1 98 Public Law 87-624, August 31, 1962, 76 Stat. 419.
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munications satellite system and recognizes the need to make efficient
use of the restricted number of radio frequencies available for space
communications. 199 In Gardner's view an express international agreement would best serve the needs of efficient space communications.
He stated, "Agreement on the reservation of an adequate part of the
frequency spectrum for space communication, and the establishment
of ground rules which will assure noninterference of space communications of different countries with each other or with other services
on earth, are an obvious prerequisite to progress." 200 Unlike Busak,
who suggested that such express agreements should be multilateral,
it was Gardner's opinion that a functional rather than a doctrinaire
approach was required. This could result, in his view, in different
kinds of arrangements, which could be either bilateral and regional
as well as multilateral.
Implicit in the views of all who have written on the subject of
space communications is the belief that no state or other person
should engage in harmful interference so long as space vehicles are
being used for peaceful, i.e., nonaggressive and beneficial, purposes.
The most general demand has been for the express allocation and
subsequent international control of radio frequencies. Furthermore,
specific demands have been voiced that spacecraft shall not transmit
radio messages which may interfere with other telecommunications
systems. It has been frequently suggested that transmissions from
spacecraft shall be terminated when the mission of the satellite has
been completed. 201 The Committee on Aeronautics of the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York has put forward the following
principle for radio spectrum management:
The High Contracting Parties agree to take all measures necessary:
(a) within the International Telecommunications Union,
to assign and allocate spectrum bands so as to avert undue interference between radio transmissions to or from space and
other radio transmissions ;
199 Gardner, "Space ~Ieteorology and Communications: A Challenge to Science and Diplomacy," 48 Department of State Bulletin 744 (1963). Compare,
Farley, "Foreign Policy Aspects of Communications Satellites," 45 Department
of State Bulletin 420 ( 1961). Farley makes reference to the need to conserve
the frequency spectrum.
200 Gardner, op. cit., 743.
2 0 1 JI agna Carta of Space, Resolution Adopted by the Twelfth Conference
of the Inter-American Bar Association 3 (1961) ; Davies Draft Code of Rules
on the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space 12.
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(b) to assure, by appropriate devices for cut-off, detonation,
or other means of termination, that radio transmitters in space
craft will not outlive their period of useful activity;
(c) to notify the International Telecommunications Union
upon the termination provided in subparagraph (b) above. 20'2
The need to prevent harmful interference in radio transmissions
to and from space vehicles must not only be accepted as a central
principle of the law of outer space, but there must also be a
sufficiently precise express agreement detailing the rights and duties
of those engaging in broadcasting. There is a need for greater legal
precision in allocating rights, and for conforming to allocations.
The need to clarify procedures whereby a state injured by harmful
interference may take appropriate legal action to correct the injurious conditions is also paramount.
The criticality of interference during an operating situation necessitates immediate responses which are likely to remedy the wrongful interference. The seriousness of this situation has been described
by Pierce. He said that "if orientation is achieved or influenced by
command, there is an added hazard that the system will be activated
by a foreign transmitter. If elaborate codes are used to avoid this,
there is a great hazard tliat malfunction will make the equipment
unresponsive to legitimate commands. These are not idle worries;
space payloads and command systems have been sadly fallible in
practice." 203
Glazer has warned if mankind is to enjoy effective communications through the use of space satellites, and if such satellites are to
engage in the functions for which they have been designed, that it
will be necessary for states to make provision in international comn1unications agreements for rules which are different both in kind
and degree from earlier ones. In comparing past efforts with present needs, he has stated that the older "equivocal regulations satisfying all of the nations all of the time may not prove technically
reconcilable with the uses of radio for command and orientation of
space vehicles, destruction of perilously errant vehicles, and safety
of rocket-borne astronauts." '204 For all of these reasons a suitable
express international agreement is urgently needed. Until such an
agreement is negotiated and becomes operational, cooperative measures among states will be required to forestall or minimize violations
2o2 Sorne Tentative Provisions tor International Agreements on Space Activities 11-12 (l\1arch 24, 1960).
2o3 Pierce, "Hazards of Communications Satellites," in Odishaw, ed., The
Challenges of Space 65 ( 1962).
2o4 Glazer, supra note 161 at 310.
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of the basic principle prohibiting harmful interference. To the extent that states engage in practices which result in harmful interference to vital space communications, it will be necessary for the
injured state to employ all measures of redress permitted by international law. These measures range from mere protest to such reasonable and peaceful measures, involving a minimum of coercion, as
may be required to insure compliance with the principle. The joint
sanctions of reciprocity and potential retaliation would probably
protect the principle except in cases of unla,vful aggression.

D. NATIONAL JURISDICTION OVER OUTER SPACE
ACTIVITIES
Jurisdiction as used herein 1neans the "capacity of a state under
international law to prescribe or to enforce rules of law." 205 For
these purposes, the position of the United States that international
law applies to relations among states in outer space is adopted. 206
National jurisdiction relating to space activities may be considered under the traditional categories of territory as a basis for
jurisdiction, nationality as a basis for jurisdiction, the protection of
other state interests, and the protection of certain universal interests.
It will also be necessary to analyze means whereby national jurisdiction may be yielded amounting to the process whereby special exemption from such jurisdiction may be established.
The factual pattern for the following anay Isis of jurisdiction will
be limited to events involving two or more vehicles in outer space
and to events on board nationally registered or other legally authorized space vehicles.
National jurisdiction over space vehicles and their activities must
be related to the manner in 'vhich such vehicles are used and also
to the legal base upon which their employment is founded. It is
clear that space vehicles have been and will be used for commercial,
scientific, and military purposes. Private entities have been engaged
in commercial and scientific activities; public entities have used the
vehicles for all three purposes. In addition, private persons, states,
associations of states, and international organizations are also included as having used or having announced plans for the use of
space vehicles.
20 5

The Foreign Relations Law of the United States, The American Law Institute Proposed Official Draft 25 (~lay 3, 1962). Compare, Johnson, "Bases
of International Jurisdiction," Report of International Law Conference, David
Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies 32-33 (1962). It is generally
agreed that international jurisdiction is based on the consent of the parties.
2oa U.N. Doo. A/AC.105/PV .20, 18 ( 9 September 1963).

417
With the general acceptance that outer space, like the high seas,
is a res communis omnium, the analogy of the high seas as to jurisdictional rights and duties becomes of considerable significance.
Thus, the general approach taken by McDougal, Burke, and Vlasic as
to maritime situations has direct applicability to national jurisdictional problems relating to outer space. They have written (the
reader may wish to transpose spacecraft for ships and outer space
for high seas) :
.
The implementing, jurisdictional principles by which the general com1nunity of states seeks to make effective its overriding
policies of shared use have long been built, in response to the
omnipresent imperatives of harmonious and economic co-operation, about certain allocations of competence which require high
certainty and easy prediction in identification of the national
character of ships. For interactions upon the high seas, each
state has imposed upon it responsibility under both customary
international law and by many explicit agreements for the lawful conduct of ships to which it has ascribed its national character; each state may apply its authority to the ships to which
it has ascribed its national character and to events occuring
upon such ships; each state may protect the ships to which it
has ascribed its national character against interferences and deprivations by others. No state may preclude the ships of other
states from access to the high seas or directly apply its authority
to the ships of other states, except as may be authorized by international law. Every ship is required to have a national character, and scant protection is afforded ships which have no nationality .207
Each of the foregoing four subjects will be analyzed.
207

"The Maintenance of Public Order at Sea and the Nationality of Ships,"
54 A.J.I.L. 25 (1960). The authors also take into account the concept of territorial waters where no space law-sea law analogy exists, despite the need
for a doctrine of "space innocent passage" whereby a spacecraft might be
permitted to transit through another state's sovereign airspace while departing
from or returning to the earth's surface while engaged in peaceful, i.e., nonaggressive and beneficial, purposes. Thus, excluding at this time any analogy
between territorial waters and outer space, and considering only the situation
where a foreign spacecraft is situated within the territory of another state,
the final sentence of McDougal's views have applicability to jurisdiction over
spacecraft, namely, "For interactions within their internal waters and territorial sea, coastal states are of course authorized to assert authority over
ships of other states for the protection of their exclusive interests, but states
which have ascribed their national character to these ships are also conceded
a limited concurrent jurisdiction for the protection of their interests." Ibid.,
27. Compare ~fcDougal, Lasswell and Vlasic, supra note 1, at 646-749.

418
I. Territory as a Basis for Jurisdiction

As is ''ell known, the territory of a state consists of its land,
internal waters, territorial waters, the seabeds underlying such
"~aters, the subsoil below these seabeds, and its superjacent airspace.
It is also accepted that there is an approximately fixed, but yet to
be determined, point separating the airspace from outer space. In
this connection it should also be noted that whereas there is a "right
of innocent passage" for surface vessels through the territorial
"·aters of another state, there is no right of innocent passage for
aircraft through the airspace above those waters. As to space events
taking place in the foregoing areas, and affecting the subjacent state,
there can be little doubt that the state exercising sovereignty therein
"~in expect to exercise territorial jurisdiction.
The concept of territory serves as a positive basis whereby international law confers to states the right to exercise jurisdiction.
Such jurisdiction may be over criminal matters or over civil matters.
The basis of territory, as one among several possibilities, has the
n1erit of affording jurisdiction to a state which is well able to prescribe punishments or a ward damages as a result of its singular
possession of persons and facts. Under this theory of jurisdiction, it
is extremely probable that the prescribing state will have available
under its control the persons and most or all of the essential evidence
required for legal judgment.
Ho,vever, a state's jurisdiction to prescribe need not be exclusive
under the territorial principle. As is well known, when national
,~essels or aircraft or members of a national force are in a foreign
state, the state of which they are nationals may impose certain rules
upon the1n. This is treated in section 32 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law under the heading "Jurisdiction to Enforce
Aboard National Vessel or Aircraft or Against Member of National
Force." It provides that "A state has jurisdiction, as to rules within
its jurisdiction to prescribe, to enforce them (a) aboard a vessel
or aircraft having its nationality while under the control of its
commanding officer; and (b) against a member of its 1nilitary
forces." 208
Comment on this proposition follows:
The enforce1nent action which a state has jurisdiction to take
under the rule stated in this Section includes enforce1nent action in the territory of another state. It is immaterial that the
person involved is not a national of the state taking the action.
Although a state has enforcement jurisdiction under the rule
208

Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, supra note 205 at 92-93.
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stated in this Section, it may not exercise that jurisdiction in
the territory of another state (except in the case of a vessel in
innocent passage) without the express or implied consent of the
territorial state; to do so 'vould be a violation of the rights of
the territorial state under international law. 209
Although the Restatement limits the application of the foregoing
rules to nonspace entities or personnel, it should, nonetheless, follo'v that where a public spacecraft, engaged in peaceful activities,
comes to rest in a state other than that of nationality, it should be
entitled to the same treatment as the recited individuals or entities.
In the event that a foreign public space vehicle comes down on the
territory of another state as the result of bona fide distress, the
case would appear to be even clearer against the exercise of jurisdiction over the internal affairs of the space vehicle by the territorial
state. 210
These, of course, are exceptions or variations on the central rule
that a state has jurisdiction to enforce within its territory rules of
law ·which are validly prescribed by it. Thus, where a spacecraft
causes damage as a result of its con1ing into the territory of a foreig~
state, the latter state could validly adjudicate cl~ims presented by
injured persons. The victims might be affected by conflicts of law
problems along their way to ultimate recovery, and would perhaps
have to consider such matters as the enforceability of foreign judgments, choice o£ law problems, and characterization problems. 211 The
victim's government would also be able to pursue diplomatic remedies
or to engage in internationallitigation.212 Additionally, where spacecraft personnel, when in the territory o£ another state, or while outside the territory of that state, violate the criminal laws o£ that
state by breaching its peace and good order, through disturbing
public tranquility, they would be subject to the criminal jurisdiction
of that state. 213 It has previously been suggested that the manner
of entry into the territory of another state by astronauts is a factor
to be taken into account, and that where such entry is occasioned by
distress, the general principles o£ humanity should guide the conduct
of the receiving state. 214 The general principle o£ jurisdiction over
2o9
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Ibid., 93.
Ibid., 173-175. Compare, McDougal, Lasswell and Vlassic, supra note 1,

at 695-704.
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Financial Protection, supra note 5, at 78-84.
Ibid., 46, 84-85.
21a Wildenhus' Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1887).
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aliens would apply under such circumstances. As stated by Brierly,
this means that "no state is legally bound to admit aliens into its
territory, but if it does so it must observe a certain standard of decent treatment to,vards them, and their own state may demand
reparation for an injury caused to them by a failure to observe tllis
standard." 215
2. Nationality as a Basis for Jurisdiction

Nationality may be the basis for exercising jurisdiction over a
legal person, including individuals, corporations, and other private
legal entities. The Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, placing reliance on the N ottebohm Oase,216 accepted
the view that "nationality is not withiri the absolute determination
of a state" under international law so that "an individual has the
nationality of a state that confers it upon him provided there exists
a genuine link between the state and the individual." 217 Allegiance
of the individual must be given suitable weight in determining his
nationality, and since the practice at the time of this writing has been
to place 1nam1ed spacecraft under the control of military personnel
"·hile in flight, there would not seem to be any question as to the
nationality of individual astronauts.
The jurisdiction over astronauts, based on the consideration of
nationality, could vary depending-at least in the United Stateson whether they were military or civilian personnel. Orie writer has
noted that "the general laws of the United States, either civil or
cri1ninal, 1vould not automatically apply to space stations created
by the United States. Our statutes do not have extraterritorial application, except to the extent Congress has provided and as recognized by international law. Congress 1nay extend the application of
its laws to conduct aboard United States space vehicles and space
stations as it has to persons aboard its national vessels and aircraft.
The provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, however,
would continue to apply to personnel of our Armed Forces while
:m Brierly, The Law of Nations 203 (4th ed. 1949). Brierly, as have many
writers on international law, has placed more emphasis on jurisdiction over
areas than on activities conducted in such areas. Ibid., 173-228. However, there
has been a general consensus that so far as the high seas are concerned, jurisdiction must pay special heed to its uses. This approach is being adopted respecting space activities.
21 6 The Nottebohm Case, (1955) I.O.J. Reports 4.
217
Restatement, supra note 205 at 80-81. For an opposing view see 1\:IcDougal,
Burke and Vlassic, supra note 207, at 25.
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aboard spacecraft and space stations, as jurisdiction under the code
is personal without regard to physical location." 218
Although the Restatement does not make reference to the nationality of space vehicles, it does call attention to the provisions of
Articles 5, 6, and 7 of the Convention on the High Seas of April 29,
1958. Article 5 provides in part that ''Ships have the nationality of
the State whose flag they are entitled to fly. There must be a genuine
link between the State and the ship * * *" Since for the present there
does not appear to be the likelihood of "flags of convenience" for
spacecraft, the substantial controversy relating to the meaning of
"genuine link" will not affect the nationality of space vehicles. 219
Such nationality, like that of aircraft, pursuant to Article 17 of
the Convention on International Civil Aviation of December 7, 1944,
" . ill unquestionably be the product of registration. National laws
will make provision that spacecraft have the nationality of the state
in which they are registered, and this may subsequently be confirmed in international conventions. A long step has been taken in
this direction through the unanimous adoption of General Assembly
Resolution 1962 (XVIII) of December 24, 1963, which provided, "7.
The State on whose registry an object launched into outer space
is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and
any personnel thereon, while in outer space." The importance of
the "state of registry" approach is seen in the assimilation of registry
to ownership and the duty to return objects or component parts
"found beyond the limits of the State of registry * * * to that State
* * *" 2 w subject to the latter state's furnishing of identifying data
upon request prior to return. The nationality principle is also given
support in paragraph 5 of the Resolution which takes into account
"national activities" in outer space.
It is noteworthy that the Restatement does not refer to ships and
aircraft as parts of the territory of a state. This indicates the preference for the concept of nationality, even though jurisdiction based
on nationality "is similar to the jurisdiction over its territory." 221
The same approach may be taken respecting spacecraft. Evidences
of nationality may be established not only by means of national
registration, but also by reason of the information furnished to the
Menter, Astronautical Law 36-37 (1959). Compare Haughney. "Criminal
Responsibility in Outer Space," Schwartz, ed., Proceedings of the Conference
on Space Science and Space Law 146 (1964).
21 9 McDougal, Burke, and Vlasic, supra note 207, at 104-114; compare Boczek,
Flags of Convenience: An International Legal Study (1962).
220 U.N. Doc. A/RES/1962, Article 7, Annex 4, infra, p. 450.
221 Johnson, supra note 205, at 38.
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United Nations in consequence of Paragraph 1 of General Assembly
R.esolution 1721 B (XVI) by states launching objects into orbit and
beyond. National syn1bols and identification devices also give proof
of nationality, as well as the ready national identification of astronauts aboard.
Although nationality at present has been reposed in a single state
for a given spacecraft, it is possible that groups of states may wish
to afford joint nationality to a given space vehicle. This could be
accomplished via agreement, and it may be anticipated that such an
agreement would make due provision for jurisdi?tion.
3. The Protective Principle

Jurisdiction on the part of a state may also be supported by the
so-called protective principle. According to the Restatement:
(1) A state has jurisdiction to prescribe rules of law attaching legal consequences to conduct outside its territory that
threatens its security as a state, provided the conduct is generally recognized as a crime under the law of states that have
reasonably developed legal systems. zz2
This is explained as permitting a state to "prescribe a rule of
criminal law applicable to conduct outside its territory that does not
have sufficient effect within its territory to bring it within the rule
stated in § 18 but that has a potentially adverse effect upon the security of the state." 223 Under this principle a state might seek to
enforce action under its espionage laws. There would appear to be
no reason why a state could not inhibit conduct described generally
as "espionage" when conducted from outside its territory, including
outer space, if serious security considerations existed. This would
be based on national policy. If one resource state were to implement
such a policy, others would probably pass reciprocal legislation. Such
information gathering activities do not, however, violate the principles and rules of internationallaw.224
The 1935 Harvard Draft also accepted the protective principle
where an alien outside the jurisdiction of a state engaged in conduct
against the security, territorial integrity and political independence
of a state, provided such conduct on the part of the alien was not
the exercise of a liberty guaranteed to the alien under the law of the
place where the act was performed. Johnson, in commenting on the
22 2

Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, supra note 205, at 94.
Ibid. Section 18 is entitled "Jurisdiction to Prescribe With Respect to
Effect Within Territory," and involves application of the territorial principle.
224 Supra, pp. 271-295, 368.
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Harvard Draft, has stated that "there were some threats to the state
which the territorial theory, even objectively applied, could not
cover, and that a jurisdiction must exist under which such threats
could be repressed. But how to deal with these threats, without appearing to grant totalitarian regimes carte blanche to apply the
protective principle in an arbitrary manner * * *" is a continuing
dilemma.225
4. The Universality Principle

The fourth principle mentioned in the Restatement is known as
the principle of universality, i.e., "Protection of Certain Universal
Interests." 226 Included within this category are piracy, collision and
salvage on the high seas, and the conservation of fisheries.
It is well known that piracy is a crime under international law.
Although the prospects of space piracy are remote, such pirates in
space may well be treated as maritime pirates and for the same
reasons. The Restatement provjdes that "a state has jurisdiction to
take enforcement action in its territory or on the high seas against
the crime of piracy under international law, provided such action is
consistent with the Convention on the High Seas of April 29,
1958." 227 This Convention restated the customary law on the subject.
The 1935 Harvard Draft accepted the universality principle without qualification.
Johnson, supra note 205, at 40. Jessup bas stated that the principle is a
sound one but that it is capable of leading to "extravagant extensions of state
power." Transnational Law 50 (1951) ; compare, Mora, "Criminal Jurisdiction
over Foreigners," 1958-1959 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 567 (1959)
who considers it to be subject to abuse. McDougal, Lasswell and Vlasic note
that this principle takes into account both physical location and "impact upon
value processes * * *" Supra note 1, at 647. They add: "States whose territorial community processes are substantially affected by crimes committed on
board foreign ships or aircraft, beyond their boundaries, may be accorded
competence under both the highly abstract 'protective' principle and the only
slightly more concrete 'impact territoriality' principle. Both technical formulations are but expressions of the fundamental community policy which requires
that states should be authorized to assert whatever competence is reasonably
necessary for the protection of their exclusive interests in their more important
bases of power." Ibid., 700. See, generally, Harvard Research, Jurisdiction,
Articles 7 and 8, pp. 543-563. Values protected by this principle will include
security, territorial integrity, political independence, fiscal and monetary
stability, among others. Compare, Haley, Space Law and Government, supra
note 157, at 257-267.
226 Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, supra note 205, at 96.
225
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On the subject of collision and salvage on the high seas the Restate7nent provides:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe rules of general maritime
law, as understood by the state, to govern the substantive results of civil claims for collision or salvage service on the high
seas when those claims are asserted for adjudication or other
determination in its territory against persons or vessels located
there.'2 28
Although drafted for a nonspace situation, the foregoing provision
takes into account a situation which might befall spacecraft. The
prospects of collision, though limited, do exist, although the possibility of salvage of spacecraft in outer space does not appear to be
realizable. The exercise of national jurisdiction over such events
would serve to protect state interests and can be readily justified.
Indeed, it is already assumed that a state will exercise such jurisdiction, and much analysis has been directed toward the achievement of
the measure of liability to be applied to such situations.229
5. Analysis
Before considering the respective qualities o£ the varying theories
of national jurisdiction, it may be well to stress the fact that through
international consent it may be possible to establish an international
jurisdiction which could be either exclusive of or complementary to
national jurisdictions. There have been suggestions on the part of
respected observers that an international space authority should be
created and then vested with jurisdiction to control the operation of
space vehicles and their equipment.'230 Others have suggested that
space activities should be removed entirely from national managenlent and placed in the hands of an operating international institution.'231 In both instances the international organization, either
through establishing the conditions under which national activities
Ibid., 99.
Supra, pp. 351-380.
230 nlankiewicz, supra note 12 at 202. Rivoire has suggested that an interna-
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tional space agency be vested with the authority to deal with space vehicles
\Vhich exceed 300 kilometers in height or when they go into orbit. "The Agency
would then be responsible for any damage which might be caused, for example,
by a collision in space, by disintegration and damage caused by pieces of the
craft falling on earth, etc." Rivoire, "Design for a Space Law," First Colloquium 101.
231 Leopold and Scafuri, "Orbital and Super-Orbital Space Flight Trajectories
-Jurisdictional Touchstones for a United Nations Space Authority," Legal
Problems of Space Exploration, A Symposium 533-535. It has frequently been
suggested that such a body should be a part of the United Nations.
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might be carried on and supervising them, or by actually engaging
in all space activities, would exercise exclusive jurisdiction. It has
been suggested that through such possible international control, space
vehicles would not become devices used to intimidate or subjugate
states and peoples. 232
Jenks has compared the desirability of vesting jurisdiction over
all space activities in an international organization with the typical
cooperative procedures which have developed for shipping and aircraft. He has favored the first approach, and stated that "great
advantages in vesting the necessary authority in an international
body [exist] if this should be politically practicable, but the difficulties of so doing may well be formidable, particularly in view of the
close relationship between the exploration and exploitation of space
and questions of defense." '233 His final judgment was: "Failing such
an international solution of the problem of jurisdiction in space
beyond the atmosphere, it will be necessary to determine such jurisdiction on the basis of appropriate criteria inspired by analogies
drawn from maritime and aviation law and to develop common international rules and standards governing the wide range of problems
'vhich would exist." '234 With the advent of the latter situation, despite the substantial capabilities of, and contributions by, the United
Nations, the alternatives presented through the different theories of
national jurisdiction have become very important.
It should be noted that the four theories of national jurisdiction
relating to the peaceful, i.e., nonaggressive and beneficial, uses of
outer space are complementary rather than exclusive. At the time
of this writing, it is becoming increasingly clear that the protective
principle, despite the possibility of its abuse, and the nationality
principle are being accorded a preferred status. This has resulted
from the focus of attention on activities carried on in outer space
and the causal relationship between such activities and the general
'velfare of mankind divided into nation-states.1235 While the principle
has been established at the United Nations that outer space is free
for use solely for peaceful purposes, in the age of the atom it is not
232

Jessup and Taubenfeld, Controls for Outer Space and the Antarctic
Analogy 265-282 (1959).
233 Jenks, supra note 88, at 39.
234 Ibid., 44.
235 McDougal and Lipson, supra note 187, at 407; Feldman, "An American
View of Jurisdiction in Outer Space," First Colloquium 47; Legal Problems of
Space Exploration, A. Symposium 456. The latter has noted that the "right
of a State to regulate and control conduct occurring entirely outside its territory which may have direct effects within its territory [must rely on a]
jurisdiction [which] is not territorial or spatial but causal." Ibid.
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possible for states to accept a theory of jurisdiction which does not
take into account the defensive needs of the state. It has been stated
that "the rationale of the protective principle of jurisdiction is * * *
the principle of self-defense." 236 The nationality principle may be
derived from the sovereignty which a state exercises over its nationals
and over its property. For this reason there has never been any doubt
as to the applicability of that principle to the conduct of nationals
and national spacecraft in outer space, thereby permitting the exercise of jurisdiction on such facts. The real problem for a theory of
space jurisdiction has been to provide a basis for the exercise of
jurisdiction over nonnationals and nonnational spacecraft in an
area beyond the sovereignty of a state. The protective principle of
jurisdiction serves this purpose.237 Of course, it hardly need be noted
that a theory of jurisdiction based on protection and self-defense is
a far cry from the exercise of sovereignty in outer space.
The fact that there are four principal theories relating to national
jurisdiction over criminal or tortious conduct suggests the presence
of inadequacies or defects in all of them. The United States, it has
been said, has employed the territorial principle to cope with the
problem of jurisdiction over crimes. 238 Judge Carter in commenting
on this has indicated that "as a statement of the entire international
law of jurisdiction it is inadequate." '239 Nonetheless, international
law does provide guidance as to which nation or nations may take
jurisdiction, :for it permits "any nation which has a reasonable relationship with the persons involved, or with the occurrence itself,
to take jurisdiction and to adjudicate the matter." 240 Whether the
final decision is based on the four preceding principles (some writers
stress only three, namely, nationality, territoriality, or protective) '241
the concept of jurisdiction exists to support the need for legal order
and stability in outer space and in space related activities, just as
there is a need for such order and stability in the airspace, on the
high seas, and on the land surfaces of the earth.
Johnson, supra note 205, at 41.
For a description of how such a process evolves, and a statement of the
values involved, see 1\:IcDougal and Lipson, supra note 187, at 419-422.
238 Preuss, "American Conception of Jurisdiction with Respect to Conflicts of
Laws on Crime," 30 Transactions ot the Grotius Society 184 (1944).
239 U.S. vs. Rodriguez, 182 F Supp 479, 488 (So. Dist. Calif. 1960).
240 Ward, "Projecting the Law of the Sea into the Law of Space," 1957 The
JAG Journal 6 (March 1957).
241 Sarkar, "The Proper Law of Crime in International Law," 11 International
and Comparative Law Quarterly 446 (1962); McDougal and Lipson, supra
note 187, at 428. Others have developed different categories. See 1\:IcDougal,
Lasswell and Vlasic, supra note 1, at 647-700.
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Various standards have been suggested with respect to the selection
of one principle of jurisdiction as opposed to another in any given
situation. Some writers have called attention to guidance through
the concept of the "proper law" which emphasizes that jurisdiction
be exercised by that entity having the closest and most real connection with, and interest in, the problem.'242 Reese, for example, has
set up certain factors to be considered in making a choice of law,
and these have application to the problem of jurisdiction over outer
space activities. He has suggested the need to take into account certainty, predictability, and ease of application in making a selection
of rules. He has also noted .the need to take into account such conflicting considerations as the duty to make fine distinctions, to be
flexible, and to permit change to take place so that justice may be
accomplished.243
The answer to such a problem as here presented must be a practical
one, but this is affected by the political considerations which so measurably influence the growth of the law of outer space. At the United
Nations there has been some attention given to the matter of nationality of spacecraft, but little comment has taken place as to the
application of competing principles of national jurisdiction. Further, the matter of nationality has generally been connected with the
factors of ownership and registry. Thus, the United States Draft
Declaration of Principles Relating to the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space contains the following:
7. Jurisdiction over a space vehicle while it is in outer space
shall be retained by the State or international organization
which had jurisdiction at the time of launching. Ownership
and property rights in a space vehicle and its components remain unaffected in outer space or upon return to earth.:244
Sarkar, op. cit. 467-468; compare Morris, "The Proper Law of Tort," 64
Harvard Law Review 881 (1951), and see Jenks, supra note 88, at 41.
243 Reese, "The Ever Changing Rules of Choice of Law," 9 Netherlands International Law Review 389 (1962). As to the "proper law" theory he has
242

noted that "this proposed rule would not, of course, be as easy to apply as
that of the place of injury and it would not afford the same predictability of
result." Ibid., 391. The prospect of conducting space activities by nationals
of several states raises the question of choice-of-law problems for international
contracts. See Reese, "Power of Parties to Choose Law Governing Their Contracts," Nurick "Choice-of-Law Clauses and International Contracts," Amram,
"Uniform Legislation as an Effective Alternative to the Treaty Technique,"
all in 54 Proceedings ot the American Society of International Law 49-70
(1960).
2 44 U.N. Doc. A/0.1/881. Annex 10, infra, p. 459.
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Additionally, the Soviet Draft Declaration of the Basic Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space makes reference to sovereign rights on the part of
states over objects launched. Article 8 provides:
8. States shall retain their sovereign rights over objects they
launch into outer space. Rights of ownership in respect of objects launched into outer space and their components remain
unaffected while they are in outer space and upon their return
to the earth.'2 45
The emphasis on the need for nationality of spacecraft and component parts is general.246 The same holds true for the astronaut. 247
Both factors may result in jurisdiction based on nationality, but as
heretofore suggested, jurisdiction may be based on each of the other
theories with equal plausibility under pertinent fact conditions. Of
the theories mentioned, it has been suggested that the principle of
universality is the broadest, least precise, and rests on a more complex foundation. Johnson has noted that its foundation may consist
in four separate, but related, elements, namely: "(i) the sovereignty
of each state, (ii) its right to defend itself, and its collective right
to defend its fellow members of the international community, (iii)
its responsibility to the other members of the international community in such matters as piracy and war crimes and finally (iv) the
consent of the other members of the international community." 248
Any consideration of national jurisdiction must not lose sight of
the fact that these theories or doctrines must satisfy not only the
needs of states, as such, but also the world community, and that in
the course of serving practical needs they will contribute measurably
to the reduction of tensions among states. It should be noted that
these jurisdictional concepts have been applied by states only with
difficulty to activities taking place on the high seas or in the airspace. Many difficulties can be imagined in the application of one or
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.6. Annex 16, infra, p. 466.
See the "Working Paper Submitted by the Belgian Delegation on the
Unification of Certain Rules Governing Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Vehicles," U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.7, and an explanation by the Belgian delegate to the legal subcommittee of the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.25, 6-8. He stated that the "national law
of the injured person should determine the nature of the damage conferring
entitlement to compensation and the extent of liability * * *" Ibid., 7. See
Davies Draft Code of Rules on the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space 15.
~Iachowski, supra note 80, at 1208-1212.
247 Cocca, supra note 115, at 147-148.
248 Johnson, supra note 205, at 41.
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all to events which take place, or will, in outer space, but that have
effects which are not limited to that dimension. In vie'v of this situation, McDougal and Lipson have suggested the possibility of a compromise through the establishment of a rule allocating jurisdiction
over space activities to the state of last departure or first landing.249
This solution, which might be the product either of customary international law or of express international agreement, like the others,
'vould permit "any state substantially affected to assert its competence, when it has effective control over persons and assets * * *"
Taken together, these approaches might provide "sufficient alternatives in choice to encourage flexible accommodation in reciprocal demand and mutual tolerance." 250 Without the presence of this last
quality none of the theories will be of much use.
At the present time much additional thought will have to be given
by states to the problems of jurisdiction over space objects. Resolution 1962 (XVIII) of December 24, 1963, was notable in what it
failed to say, although it did produce modest clarificatioh in providing "7. The State on whose registry an object launched into
outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such
object, and any personnel thereon, while in outer space." 251 Additional declarations setting forth an international consensus as to
jurisdictional rules affecting spacecraft in the atmosphere or land
or water areas of the nonowning state are sorely needed. Until such
a consensus can be expressly stated, existing understandings as to
rights based on registry or ownership may have little if any impact
on the jurisdictional rights of the receiving state for objects coming
within its sovereign boundaries. Under such circumstances the receiving state may be held to be free to determine which theories it
is willing to apply in the exercise of its national jurisdiction.
Finally, the subject of national jurisdiction requires brief reference to the matter of immunities and waiver. With regard to outer
space activities having a jurisdictional impact on the affairs of a state,
it is possible for claims to be made relating to the immunity of
state owned property, the rights of public representatives of :foreign
states, and the immunity of international organizations and their
personnel. Other situations in which such claims may be asserted
may be predicted when space activities take on a heightened tempo.
The various considerations which have proven acceptable with re249

McDougal and Lipson, supra note 187, at 407.
Ibid.
251
U.N. Doc. A/RES/1962 (XVIII). Annex 4, infra, p. 450.
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(Italics added.)
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spect to nonspace assertions of immunity will unquestionably be
pertinent to the subject of immunities ;252 the same would undoubtedly prevail for matters of waiver. Both the subject of national jurisdiction and the subject of international jurisdiction are pressing
ones and could readily be treated in appropriate express agreements between states and other public entities.
Bishop, International Law 550-619 (2nd ed., 1962) ; Fenwick, International Law 307-309 (3d ed., 1948).
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